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Preface
“The banking industry is the circulatory system of the economy. It’s
analogous to the heart. Breaking your arm is unpleasant – it takes
awhile to recover but eventually you’re as good as new. If your heart
fails, you’re in trouble.”
John Steele Gordon, a business historian in The Financial Times,
17 November 2010
The financial sector has an enormous influence on the real economy and on welfare:
When it is in a good shape, it generates economic growth and prosperity by funding
investments and consumption. But when the banking industry gets into trouble, there
are immense consequences for the whole economy, as the financial crisis in 2007/2008
has impressively demonstrated: In the aftermath, the global economy was shrinking
for the first time since the Second World War (International Monetary Fund, 2018).
In particular many developed countries suffered from severe slumps in their GDPs.1
Economic literature confirms the role of banks as the heart of an economy, with periods
of instability in the banking sector causing substantial decreases in real output growth
(Jokipii and Monnin, 2013).
Accordingly, the fiscal costs that a troubled financial industry causes can be enor-
mous. During the financial crisis, governments around the world have implemented
tremendously large bail out programs for ailing banks to keep their economies alive:
For instance, in Ireland the costs of bank bail outs summed up to 40.7% of the coun-
try’s GDP. And also countries less specialized in the financial industry spent large
sums to support their banks (e.g. 8.8% of GDP in the United Kingdom and 4.5% in
1As data of the International Monetary Fund (2018) shows, the world wide real GDP was
shrinking by -0.4% in 2009. Many developed countries faced much sharper declines, for instance
the UK with a real GDP growth of -4.3%, the US with -2.8% or Germany with -5.6%.
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the United States) and prevent even more severe economic consequences (Laeven and
Valencia, 2012).
By contrast, the financial sector’s contributions to the state budget do not adequately
correspond to these potential fiscal costs and the risks the banking sector poses to the
economy. Anecdotal evidence shows that particularly large commercial banks pay
only a strikingly small amount in corporate taxes (FAZ, 2013), and that multinational
banks have set up extensive tax avoidance schemes (Financial Times, 2017). As Oxfam
(2017) illustrates by evaluating the newly introduced country-by-country reporting in
the banking sector, European banks report a large share of their profits in tax havens
instead, although employing only a small fraction of their workforce there: Average
profits per employee weree6.3 million in affiliates in the Cayman Islands, for instance,
whereas the same banks report only e29,000 of profits per employee in their high-tax
home countries.
This thesis considers the challenges the legislator faces in the taxation of the financial
sector. The focus is led on banks’ reactions to taxation and the ways banks shift the
tax base to affiliates in low-tax countries. Two major channels of profit shifting for
corporate tax avoidance are investigated. Moreover, I study a newly introduced bank-
specific tax instrument, bank levies, and whether banks shift also this tax base to lower
taxed affiliates. Previous literature on tax avoidance has largely ignored the banking
sector, and literature on bank activities has mostly not considered the role of taxes.
Contributing to these strands of literature, this dissertation studies how banks react
to taxes.
There is substantial work on profit shifting of non-financial multinationals, both the-
oretical studies (e.g. Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000; Peralta et al., 2006; Huizinga
and Laeven, 2008; Hong and Smart, 2010) and empirical contributions (e.g. Bartels-
man and Beetsma, 2003; Weichenrieder, 2009; Dharmapala, 2014; Heckemeyer and
Overesch, 2017). By contrast, literature on tax avoidance in the financial sector is
sparse: Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) are the first showing that banks engage
in extensive profit shifting to avoid corporate taxes. Also Huizinga et al. (2014), Gu
et al. (2015) and Merz and Overesch (2016) find profit shifting evidence in the financial
sector, but all of these studies cannot identify precise channels through which banks
shift their profits to lower taxed affiliates.
The first two chapters of my dissertation contribute to this line of literature by iden-
tifying two main profit shifting channels in the financial sector: Chapter 1 studies the
strategic relocation of the highly profitable proprietary trading business to low-tax
2
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countries, without actually shifting the real activity of trading there. Chapter 2 inves-
tigates banks’ strategic use of internal debt, a profit shifting channel well established
in the literature on non-financial multinationals (e.g. Fuest et al., 2011; Buettner et al.,
2012; Egger et al., 2014). The results of these two essays suggest that the corporate
tax is not sufficient to ensure that banks pay an appropriate share in taxes. After hav-
ing incurred the high costs of the financial crisis, several countries introduced a new
tax instrument: As a tax on inter-bank liabilities, bank levies do not only generate
additional tax revenues, but they should also have a Pigouvian effect on banks’ poten-
tially risk-transmitting funds. Chapter 3 shows that this intention largely has worked
out for the German bank levy, but multinational banks use ways to circumvent the tax
payments also with this new bank tax.
All essays in this dissertation have in common that the empirical analysis is based on
administrative bank-level data provided for research by the German central bank. Al-
though the size of the German banking sector is relatively small compared to large
financial centers like the United Kingdom, the data are of exceptional quality as they
comprise a full sample of all German banks and their foreign affiliates. Whereas previ-
ous literature had to rely on commercial bank datasets (e.g. Bankscope), I have access
to comprehensive and detailed micro data that does not suffer from missing values or
a potentially inconsistent data collection. Moreover, unlike datasets used in previ-
ous literature, it also provides data on foreign branches rather than only subsidiaries,
showing that a large part of banks’ business abroad is conducted in branches instead of
legally independent subsidiaries. When regarding banks’ internal debt structures in
Chapter 2, I can even use bilateral internal debt data at the micro level, which allows
the most precise identification of internal debt shifting.
All chapters in this thesis evaluate the effectiveness of tax instruments in the banking
sector. In the following, I will outline a brief overview of the lines of argument and the
results found in each chapter. All chapters are based on stand-alone papers and can
be read separately. Chapter 1 is based on a co-authored paper.2
Chapter 1 uses these precise German micro data to explore how banks strategically
locate their proprietary trading assets to low-tax jurisdictions. This is a novel and
bank-specific profit shifting channel different from those that previous literature has
identified for non-financial firms. The essay shows that a one percentage point lower
corporate tax rate increases banks’ fixed-income trading assets by 4.0% and trading
2Chapter 1 is co-authored with Prof. Dr. Dominika Langenmayr. To clarify that this is joint
work, this essay uses the pronoun “we”.
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derivatives by 9.0%. This relocation of trading assets is not necessarily profit shifting,
it could just be a relocation of real activity. However, we show that the increase of
trading assets in low-tax jurisdictions is not accompanied by a relocation of traders –
only book profits are shifted instead, whereas the real activity (traders that decide on
the trading strategy) remains in high-tax countries. Therefore, the relocation of banks’
trading assets is indeed a profit shifting channel, similar to the relocation of intangible
assets in non-financial firms (see e.g. Dischinger and Riedel, 2011). Moreover, the
essay conducts a back-of-the-envelope calculation of lost tax revenues due to this tax
avoidance channel. Assuming a 2% return on trading assets, results imply a loss
equal to 32% of tax revenues currently collected from the German banking sector.
This chapter is based on joint work with Prof. Dr. Dominika Langenmayr, Catholic
University Eichsta¨tt-Ingolstadt (Langenmayr and Reiter, 2017).
In Chapter 2 I investigate how banks use internal debt relations to shift profits to
lower taxed affiliates. By taking out loans from low-taxed branches and subsidiaries,
multinationals can shift profits to these affiliates: The related interest payments are
deductible from the tax base in the high-tax country and are taxed at lower rates in the
low-tax country, generating a tax saving equal to the interest payment times the tax
rate differential. With the regulatory data on German multinational banks I find that
banks indeed use this internal debt shifting channel extensively. Comparing results to
previous literature shows that banks engage more aggressively in this tax avoidance
channel than non-financial multinationals do. One potential explanation for this find-
ing is that some anti-profit-shifting regulations explicitely do not apply to the banking
sector. Another potential reason is the general acceptance of high leverages in the fi-
nancial sector, giving banks additional scope for internal debt financing. The extensive
use of the internal debt shifting channel becomes even clearer when I correct for con-
duit entities that simply pass through internal debt: A ten percentage points higher
corporate tax rate increases the internal net leverage by substantial 5.63 percentage
points, corresponding to an 18% increase at the mean. In accounting for conduit debt
I make a more general point on internal debt shifting literature, as results of previous
studies on this tax avoidance channel are biased if the location of conduit entities is
correlated with corporate tax rates. In my sample I find that mainly low-taxed bank
affiliates hold conduit debt, explaining the under-estimation of internal debt shifting
when not accounting for conduit entities.
The third chapter studies a new bank tax that was introduced in several countries
as a consequence of the financial crisis. These bank levies should not only generate
4
Preface
additional tax revenues: They have the clear Pigouvian intention to reduce systemic
risks in the banking sector by taxing risk-transmitting inter-bank liabilities. Inducing
banks to reduce this tax base, the legislators seek to decrease inter-connectedness of
banks and improve their capitalization. My essay exploits the design of the German
bank levy introduced in 2011, which exempts banks below a certain threshold from
levy payments and sets a progressive levy schedule for all banks above. In a difference-
in-differences setting I compare levy-affected banks with non-affected banks below the
exemption threshold and find that affected banks significantly decreased their relevant
liabilities by about 7% to 9%. Furthermore, I do not find evidence for a substitution
of inter-bank liabilities by unaffected customer deposits or equity. Together these
results suggest that the risk and inter-connectedness of German core institutes has
indeed decreased due to the introduction of the bank levy. I also show a corresponding
decrease in individual banks’ risk by applying the difference-in-differences estimator
to two bank risk measures. However, in a second step I show that multinational banks
circumvent also this new bank tax by exploiting a loophole in the bank levy law.
As foreign subsidiaries of German banks are not subject to the levy, multinational
banks can simply shift the affected funds to these affiliates. Comparing German bank
subsidiaries in countries without bank levies with non-German banks, I find evidence
for such a fund shifting. Moreover, I show that banks having potential subsidiaries to
shift to, effectively do not reduce their group-wide inter-bank liabilities. With these
banks holding 18% of total relevant liabilities, this loophole weakens the positive effect
of reducing systemic risk in the banking sector.
To sum up, the chapters in this dissertation show that it is extremely difficult to
effectively tax the financial sector. Closing the gap in the literature on profit shifting
channels for corporate tax avoidance in the banking sector, I first show that banks
engage in extensive profit shifting, rendering the standard corporate tax a rather
inappropriate tax instrument for the financial sector. An alternative could be special
bank taxes, like the German bank levy, which I also investigate in this dissertation.
But again, results show that banks use their possibilities to avoid also this new bank
tax. The banking sector therefore poses a great challenge for legislators to carefully
design tax instruments for banks without loopholes, that ensure that the financial
sector contributes to the public budget in a dimension that is adequate to its crucial
role as the heart of the whole economy.
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Trading Offshore: Evidence on
Banks’ Tax Avoidance
1.1 Introduction
During the financial crisis of 2007-2008, bank bailouts burdened governments with
enormous debts. The bailout of just one Irish bank, Anglo Irish, cost the Irish gov-
ernmente 25 billion, or 11.3% of GDP (Acharya et al., 2014). In this situation, many
commentators asked whether banks pay their fair share in taxes. Anecdotal evidence
indeed suggests that banks pay little tax: According to The Independent (2015), five
of the world’s biggest investment banks (JP Morgan, Bank of America Merrill Lynch,
Deutsche Bank AG, Nomura Holding and Morgan Stanley) paid no corporate tax in
the United Kingdom in 2014, despite some of them reporting profits of several hundred
million U.S. dollars there. Yet despite the importance of the financial sector, there is
little systematic evidence on this question, as most studies on corporate tax avoidance
exclude the financial sector.
One reason for excluding the financial sector when studying profit shifting is that the
business model of financial firms differs so substantially from other firms. For manu-
facturing and non-financial services, the literature has pointed out three main profit
shifting channels: Internal loans, the manipulation of transfer prices, and the strate-
gic relocation of intellectual property. Of these three, banks can primarily use internal
This chapter is based on joint work with Dominika Langenmayr (Langenmayr and Reiter, 2017).
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loans to shift substantial amounts to low-tax countries.1 At the same time, research
has shown that internal debt is not the dominant profit shifting channel (Heckemeyer
and Overesch, 2017). Thus, the question how financial firms shift profits is largely
unanswered. To address this question, we propose a new and quantitatively impor-
tant profit shifting channel specific to the financial sector: The strategic relocation of
assets held for proprietary trading.
A second reason why few researchers have studied banks’ tax avoidance is that most
large datasets on multinational banks only cover subsidiaries, not branches. However,
banks use branches extensively: About a quarter of foreign affiliates of the 100 largest
banks worldwide are branches, and the choice between opening a subsidiary or a
branch varies systematically with a country’s tax rate (Cerutti et al., 2007). In this
essay, we use a newly available regulatory dataset provided by the German central
bank (the External Positions of Banks database). This dataset includes information
on all foreign subsidiaries and branches of German banks. The data is of exceptional
quality and provides a complete picture of the foreign activities of all German banks.
We also confirm that our findings hold for banks headquartered outside Germany by
using Bureau van Dijk’s Bankscope dataset.
We propose that banks relocate assets held for proprietary trading to shift profits to
low-tax countries. Proprietary trading is very profitable, so relocating these assets to
low-tax jurisdictions lowers total tax payments substantially.2 It thus has the potential
to constitute a major profit shifting channel. At the same time, gains from proprietary
trading are very mobile, especially as banks do not necessarily develop the trading
strategy in the same country as where they carry out the trades.
Our results confirm that banks indeed relocate assets held for proprietary trading to
countries with lower tax rates. Using variation within bank groups and over time, we
show that a one percentage point lower tax rate increases fixed-income proprietary
trading assets held in an affiliate by 4.0% on average, and trading derivatives by 9.0%.
These results are robust to different specifications, e.g. using a selection model to
control for the strategic placement of affiliates, and to using a completely different,
1To a limited extent, banks can also use the other two profit shifting channels. Banks may
have some intellectual property (e.g. their brand name), and also set transfer prices (e.g. for fees
or loans). However, the amounts shifted in these ways are small relative to other sectors (e.g.
the intellectual property of Apple or Amazon, or the transfer pricing possibilities in a vertically
integrated manufacturing firm).
2From 2009 to 2014, proprietary trading accounted on average for 32% of the after-tax profits
of German banks (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2016a).
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international dataset.
We find a tax semi-elasticity of -4.0 for fixed-income trading assets. Comparing this
number to other estimates of tax semi-elasticities from the literature, it becomes clear
that proprietary trading reacts especially strongly to taxation. According to the meta-
study of Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017), the average tax semi-elasticity of pre-tax
profits is -0.8. However, studies of specific methods of profit shifting have found
decidedly higher tax semi-elasticities. For example, Karkinsky and Riedel (2012)
document a semi-elasticity of -3.8 for patent applications; Dudar and Voget (2016)
find a semi-elasticity of -6.2 for trademarks. These comparisons indicate that the
tax sensitivity of assets held for proprietary trading is high, but comparable to other
assets that firms relocate specifically in response to tax differentials. As gains from
proprietary tradingare large, the strategic relocationofproprietary tradingconstitutes
a major profit shifting channel.
Does the relocationofproprietary tradingactually constituteaprofit shifting strategy?
Or should we view it as a real response, similar to how firms relocate investments in
response to taxation? In principle, both interpretations are possible. Banks can either
move all activities related to trading (including, for example, the employees who set
the trading strategy), or transfer only the book assets to lower-taxed affiliates. We
interpret the second strategy as profit shifting. In our empirical study, we test if
banks also increase employment in response to a tax-induced increase in proprietary
trading. We find that a tax-induced increase in trading assets does not result in
additional employment, confirming that the tax-induced relocation of proprietary
trading is indeed a profit-shifting strategy.
We also document that the relocation of proprietary trading is a quantitatively im-
portant profit-shifting channel. Using our estimated semi-elasticities, we conduct a
back-of-the-envelope calculation. Assuming a 2% return to proprietary trading, we
find that the German tax authorities lose 32% of the tax revenue currently collected
from banks due to this profit-shifting strategy alone.
Our essay contributes to two separate strands of literature. First, we contribute to
the literature on the effect of taxation on the location of corporate activities and
corporate profits (see e.g. Clausing, 2003; Desai et al., 2004; Desai and Dharmapala,
2006; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008; Djankov et al., 2010; Dischinger and Riedel, 2011;
Dharmapala and Riedel, 2013; Dharmapala, 2014) by pointing out a novel profit-
shiftingchannel. Mostof this literature excludes thefinancial sector, but therearea few
exceptions: Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) provide indirect evidence for profit
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shifting by multinational banks.3 Huizinga et al. (2014) show that corporate tax rates
negatively affect foreign direct investment and pre-tax profits of banks. Heckemeyer
and de Mooij (2017) study the influence of taxation on leverage for both banks and non-
banks and find that on average, the marginal effect of taxation is similar in both groups.
Gu et al. (2015) show that bank debt reacts to both corporate tax rates and within-firm
tax differentials, indicating profit shifting by internal debt. Merz and Overesch (2016)
analyze how various balance-sheet items of multinational banks respond to taxation.
Their analysis also includes a regression on trading gains, where they find that these
profits are particularly responsive to corporate tax rates. In contrast to our essay, Merz
and Overesch (2016) do not differentiate between profit shifting and the relocation of
real activities; nor can they exclude that other country characteristics correlated with
tax rates drive the results.
Second, we also add to the literature on the determinants of global bank activities by
describing how corporate taxation influences the location of proprietary trading assets.
Previous papers focus on other country-level determinants of the banks international
asset choice, such as expropriation risk (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2010) and regula-
tion (Buch, 2003; Houston et al., 2012). We also contribute to the more specialised
literature on proprietary trading. Studying German equity trades, Hau (2001a) and
Hau (2001b) show that foreign traders realize lower proprietary trading profits than
domestic traders. Fecht et al. (2018) analyze the interaction between proprietary trad-
ing and the returns obtained by the bank for retail investors, showing that banks push
underperforming stocks from their proprietary portfolios into the portfolios of retail
customers. So far, this literature has not considered the impact of taxation.
The following section provides some background on proprietary trading and the taxa-
tion of banks. Section 1.3 discusses our hypotheses and Section 1.4 describes the data.
Section 1.5 provides evidence on fixed-income assets, and Section 1.6 on derivatives
held for trading. Section 1.7 offers a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the magnitude
of the effects. Section 1.8 concludes.
3They show that the profitability of foreign banks rises relatively little with their domestic tax
burden, indicating that foreign banks do not pass the tax on to their consumers. One explanation
for this result is that the banks themselves can avoid the tax by shifting profits abroad.
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1.2 Background: Proprietary Trading and Tax
Incentives
Banks are very active in tax havens (see Figure 1.1). However, Figure 1.1 tells us
nothing about the kind of activities that banks carry out in these countries. In general,
twocriteriaare important formovinga function toa low-taxcountry. First, theactivity
should be relatively mobile, so that the cost of relocating it are low. Second, it should
be highly profitable, so that there is a large tax saving of moving it to the tax haven.
One candidate for such an activity is banks’ proprietary trading.
Figure 1.1: Bank Assets per Capita
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Banks’ total claims per capita as of Q4/2015. Red bars indicate countries that Johannesen and Zucman (2014)
classify as tax havens. Logarithmic scale on the vertical axis. Calculated from bank asset data from the Bank
for International Settlements (2017) and population data from the International Monetary Fund (2018).
Proprietary trades are all trades in stocks, bonds, derivatives or any other financial
instrument that a bank carries out with its own money (as opposed to the depositors’
money). Many banks derive a large share of their profits from proprietary trading.
In our international Bankscope sample, gains from proprietary trading account on
average for 39% of banks’ pre-tax profits; for German banks, Deutsche Bundesbank
(2016a) reports that gains from trading account for 32% of after-tax profits. Propri-
etary trading thus meets the criterion of being highly profitable.
Proprietary trading activities are also highly mobile. Banks do not have to develop
the trading strategy in the same location as where they carry out the trades. While
some trading activities, especially high-frequency trades, profit from being close to
stock exchanges, other trading activities can be commissioned from almost anywhere
in the world. Thus, there is large scope for relocation in response to taxation.
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Our main dataset includes data on assets held specifically for proprietary trading. In
the following, we will call these assets “trading assets”. Figure 1.2 shows the ratio
of fixed-income trading assets to total assets for our sample of German multinational
banks. It demonstrates that banks hold substantially more trading assets in low-tax
affiliates than in high-tax affiliates.
Figure 1.2: Trading Assets as Share of Total Assets
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0.028
High-tax countries Low-tax countries
Fixed-income trading assets relative to total assets in our sample
of German multinational banks and their foreign affiliates (de-
scribed in Section 1.4). High-tax countries are countries with a
statutory corporate tax rate ≥ 30% (the German tax rate), low-
tax countries are all other countries. Bars indicate 95% intervals.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (2015a).
In the following, we will differentiatebetween “profit shifting”and the“real” relocation
of proprietary trading. We will call the relocation of trading activities “profit shifting”
if banks relocate few employees to the low-tax country, i.e. when the bank sets the
trading strategy in a high-tax country and traders in the low-tax country only carry
out the exact instructions they receive from abroad. In contrast, if a bank relocates
a significant number of employees, we will classify this action as a relocation of real
activities.
In some countries, commercial banking and proprietary trading have to be in separate
legal entities. Germany, which is the home country of the banks in our main dataset,
passed such a law in 2013. It became effective in July 2016. In principle, we expect
that such laws do not affect the incentives to relocate proprietary trading to low-tax
jurisdictions.4 Moreover, our data ends in December 2015, more than half a year
4The law requires a bank in Germany to separate proprietary trading if its holds more than
e100 billion trading assets on its balance sheet or if it has total assets of more than e90 billion
of which at least 20% are trading assets. For a discussion of the German specialized banking law
see Dombret et al. (2014).
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before the law came into effect. Furthermore, the law affects only the largest banks.
As a robustness check, we also aggregate the data over all affiliates of a bank group
in a country to account for a potential shifting of trading assets between entities in
anticipation of the new law, and find very similar results.
Each subsidiary of a German bank pays corporate tax on its profits in the country
where it is active. As Germany has a territorial tax system, almost no additional tax
is due on repatriated profits.5 The same rules apply to foreign branches of German
banks if Germany has a double taxation agreement with the host country. This is
the case for almost all countries. Therefore, in most countries, taxes do not affect the
choice between opening a subsidiary or a branch.
What other tax rules could be relevant? Controlled-foreign-corporation rules (CFC
rules) come to mind. Such rules, often in place in high-tax countries, attribute passive
income from foreign subsidiaries to the tax base of the parent company. However, in
many countries, bank profits are exempt from CFC rules (Deloitte, 2014). German
CFC rules, in particular, exclude banks under relatively loose conditions.6 As all banks
in our main dataset on the External Positions of German Banks are headquartered in
Germany, we will not incorporate CFC rules in the following considerations.
In most countries gains from proprietary trading are usually taxed at the same rate as
profits from other banking activities. Note, however, that a few countries have specific
corporate tax rates on banks or apply other tax rates on capital gains of corporations.
An example are Hong Kong and Singapore, both of which have a special zero tax
rate for corporate capital gains. These tax rates apply also (but not only) to profits
generated by the propriety trading activities of banks. In this essay, we use these
specific tax rates when applicable. Appendix 1 gives an overview over both the tax
rate that applies to banks’ proprietary trading profits and the general corporate tax
rate.
5In more detail, 95% of dividend payments to the German headquarter are exempt from
taxation in Germany. Note that dividends on short-term assets in the bank’s trading book would
not be exempt from taxation in Germany; however, the majority-owned foreign subsidiaries we
consider are part of banks’ fixed assets and thus 95% exempt from taxation.
6German CFC rules completely exclude income from banking under the condition of a ‘com-
mercially organized business operation’ in the foreign affiliate (see Fo¨rster and Schmidtmann, 2004;
Ruf and Weichenrieder, 2012). According to a decision by the German Federal Fiscal Court, it is
not even necessary that the affiliate has own employees or offices to fulfill this condition (BFH 13
Oct 2010, I R 61/09). In that case, a service contract with another affiliate was sufficient.
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1.3 Hypotheses
Our essay aims to answer two questions: Do banks strategically relocate their propri-
etary trading to low-tax countries? And, if they do so, is this a profit shifting strategy
or do they relocate real activities?
An extensive literature has shown that firms relocate activities in response to tax rate
differentials (for a survey see Devereux and Loretz, 2013). However, most firms remain
headquartered in high-tax countries, and face additional costs when they relocate
activities away from their headquarter (Dischinger et al., 2014b). Therefore, when
deciding which activities to relocate to low-tax countries, firms will take into account
two factors: first, the cost of relocating the activity; and second, its profitability, which
determines the potential tax savings.
As discussed in Section 1.2, proprietary trading meets these two criteria. Thus, in the
first part of the essay, we test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Proprietary trading activities of banks are decreasing in the corpo-
rate tax rate.
Banks can relocate proprietary trading in two ways: One possibility is to move all
activities related to proprietary trading (such as the formation of trading strategy, the
decision on individual investments and the actual trading) to a low-tax country. The
other possibility is to relocate only the actual trading to the low-tax country, while the
investment specialists, who set the investment strategy and decide in which specific
securities to invest, remain in the headquarter or in other, specialised affiliates. As
these investment specialists are well-educated, costly personnel, the tax incentive is
to deduct their cost in the high-tax country. Thus, to minimize their tax burden, we
expect that banks relocate proprietary trading activities in name only, while most of
the real activity (i.e. decisions on trading strategy etc.) remains in high-tax countries.
We thus propose the following second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 The relocation of trading activities to low-taxed affiliates takes place
without additional employees in low-tax countries.
If this hypothesis holds, the relocation of proprietary trading would constitute a “profit
shifting” strategy, similar to shifting profits by relocating patents in industrial firms.7
7For empirical evidence on the relocation of patents, see e.g. Karkinsky and Riedel (2012).
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It is important to separate profit shifting strategies from the relocation of real activ-
ities (which would be the case if all trading activities were relocated), as the welfare
implications of the two strategies may differ. While profit shifting erodes tax revenues
in high-tax countries, it can also increase investment there as it lowers the cost of cap-
ital. Its overall effect on welfare in the host country is thus ambiguous (see Hong and
Smart, 2010). In contrast, the welfare effect of the relocation of real activities is usu-
ally negative, as tax revenue and employment are lost. This conclusion holds even if
banks’ proprietary trading activities cause negative externalities, as these negative ef-
fects likely persist also when the bank relocates its trading activities to a tax haven.
Thus, while a government might strategically choose to allow some profit shifting, it
will not desire to allow the relocation of real activity.
1.4 Data and Descriptive Analysis
To test our hypotheses, we require detailed information on multinational banks. We
obtain such data from a regulatory dataset of the German central bank. In a robustness
test, we also use Bureau van Dijk’s Bankscope dataset.
Our main data source is the External Positions of Banks database of the German
central bank (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2015a). The Bundesbank collects this data for
regulatory purposes as well as an input to calculate both monetary and balance of
payment statistics. The database covers all German banks, including all majority-
owned foreign subsidiaries and branches. We observe every foreign subsidiary and an
aggregated value for each bank’s branches in a country.8 The sample consists of 106
internationallyactivebankgroups inGermany, with foreignsubsidiaries in33countries
and branches in 46 countries. The three largest banks together have subsidiaries in 29
countries, and branches in 42 countries. The data is available on a monthly basis from
December 2010 to December 2015. As reporting to the Bundesbank is mandatory, we
observe the complete population of German banks.
To study whether the relocation of proprietary trading is a form of profit shifting or
the relocation of real activity, we merge in employment data from the Microdatabase
Direct Investment (MiDi), also provided by the Bundesbank. This dataset includes
foreign subsidiaries and branches whose total assets exceede 3 million. It is available
8We also observe information on the German headquarter. As Dischinger et al. (2014a) show
that firms are reluctant to shift profits away from their headquarters, we do not use this information
when estimating tax semi-elasticities.
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on a yearly basis.9 Moreover, to construct our control variables, we use country level
information from various sources (see Appendix A.2 for details).
To test Hypothesis 1, we use two different dependent variables: Fixed-income assets
held for proprietary trading, and derivatives held for proprietary trading. Both vari-
ables measure the current value of trading assets held in an affiliate.10 We cannot use
stocks held for trading, as the Bundesbank data does not differentiate between stocks
held for trading and those held as liquidity reserve. Unfortunately, the data for deriva-
tives are available only for a shorter time period (December 2013 to December 2015).
In which countries do German banks hold their trading assets? In Table 1.1, we list
the top five countries in which German bank groups had the most proprietary trading
assets in 2014.11 Outside of the home market Germany, most trading assets are in
countries with large financial sectors (e.g. the United Kingdom or the United States),
but also in tax havens such as Singapore or the Cayman Islands.12 In some of these
countries, banks hold most of their proprietary trading assets in branches (e.g. in the
United Kingdom or the Cayman Islands); in other countries, these assets are in legally
independent subsidiaries (e.g. in Poland). Banks tend to hold more derivatives than
fixed-income assets for proprietary trading.
The main drawback of the Bundesbank data is that the sample is relatively small,
even though it covers the full population of German multinational banks. Moreover,
one might worry about external validity, given that the dataset contains only banks
headquartered in Germany. To address these concerns, we rerun our analysis using
Bureau van Dijk’s Bankscope dataset in Appendix 3. Large parts of the literature on
the taxation and regulation of banks use this dataset (see e.g. Gu et al., 2015; Houston
et al., 2012; Huizinga et al., 2014; Merz and Overesch, 2016).
Bankscope provides comprehensive information on balance sheets, income statements
9For a detailed description of this dataset, see Lipponer (2011).
10In line with international financial reporting standards, German banks have to assign trading
assets their fair value. The lowest value principle (which is usually the mandatory accounting
principle for assets in Germany) does not apply to bank assets held for trading.
11Due to the confidentiality requirements of the Bundesbank, we cannot list countries in which
less than three German banks conduct proprietary trading.
12In the United States, a substantial part of trading assets is likely in affiliates in Delaware,
where banks can also profit from various corporate tax benefits. For instance, seven of Deutsche
Bank’s eight securities trading firms in the US are based in Wilmington, Delaware (Deutsche Bank
AG, 2014). Unfortunately we cannot observe the exact location of a bank affiliate within the US
in our dataset. As a robustness check we also estimate equation (1) without affiliates in the US
and find similar results.
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Table 1.1: Top 5 Countries for Foreign Trading Activities in 2014
Fixed-income trading assets Trading derivatives
# Country Total % held in Country Total % held in
(in me) branches (in me) branches
1 United Kingdom 42,596 100 United Kingdom 259,500 100
2 United States 7,417 95 United States 203,800 100
3 Italy 2,589 23 Italy 61,513 100
4 Singapore 2,422 40 Singapore 6,621 100
5 Cayman Islands 1,493 100 Poland 1,419 0
Total 67,498 91 Total 645,175 99
Data from External Positions of Banks database of Deutsche Bundesbank (2015a). Totals of fixed-income
securities and derivatives that are held for trading by German multinational banks in foreign affiliates, in
million euro. Countries in which less than three banks are active are not shown here due to confidentiality
requirements.
and ownership for banks and bank subsidiaries worldwide. The main advantages of
this dataset are that it covers banks headquartered anywhere in the world, and that it
is available for a longer time period. However, Bankscope has substantial drawbacks
regarding both the extent of coverage of affiliates, and the quality of the data. First,
Bankscope has information only on subsidiaries but no information on branches. This
is a major disadvantage: Table 1.1 confirms that in some countries, German banks
hold their trading assets exclusively in branches (e.g. in the United Kingdom or the
Cayman Islands). Thus, using a dataset that does not include branches may introduce
selection problems. Second, the coverage – even of subsidiaries – in the Bankscope data
isunclear. Therearemanymissingvalues for total tradingassets, andwedonotobserve
all subsidiaries of multinational bank groups. For example, the Bundesbank database
reports seven subsidiaries of German banks that are active in trading in Singapore.
But in Bankscope there is only one German-owned bank active in Singapore, and there
is no information on its trading assets.13 Overall we prefer the Bundesbank data due
to its comprehensive sample coverage and its excellent quality. Nevertheless we also
use Bankscope as a consistency check for our results.
13The Bankscope data also do not report historical ownership, so our analysis implicitly assumes
that ownership has not changed for the banks in our sample.
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Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. p1 p50 p99 Frequ.
Fixed-income trading assets (million e) 16,793 255 2,401 0 0 2,910 M
Trading derivatives (million e) 6,460 2,721 28,600 0 0 56,000 M
Total assets (million e) 16,793 4,851 27,000 0 727 95,300 M
Corporate tax rate 16,793 0.241 0.103 0.000 0.250 0.400 M
Nominal GDP (million e) 16,793 121,626 235,432 197 35,523 1,175,961 Q → M
Inflation rate (%) 16,793 2.154 2.946 -1.399 1.818 11.468 M
GDP growth (%) 16,793 1.922 2.753 -4.426 1.829 9.436 Q → M
Regulation 16,793 1.349 0.681 1 1 3 -
Financial sector share 16,793 0.106 0.095 0.031 0.069 0.422 Q → M
Subsidiary dummy 16,793 0.280 0.449 0 0 1 M
Bank group total assets (million e) 16,793 345,000 503,000 29 65,200 1,410,000 M
Employees (yearly) 1,290 785 3478 0 64 16,314 A
Sample period from 12/2010 to 12/2015, except for trading derivatives, which are only available from 12/2013 to 12/2015. M/Q/A
indicate monthly, quarterly and annual frequency. We calculate monthly GDP from interpolated quarterly GDP values using the
proportional Denton method as described in Bloem et al. (2001), and monthly GDP growth from these values. We derive the monthly
financial sector share by cubic spline interpolation. For data sources see Appendix A.2.
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Table 1.2 gives an overview over the descriptive statistics for the main variables in
the Bundesbank dataset. Fixed-income trading assets amount on average to e255
million per foreign affiliate. There are significantly more derivatives held for trading
(on average e2.721 billion per affiliate). As we observe derivatives only from 12/2013
to 12/2015, there are only 6,460 observations for trading derivatives, compared to
16,793 observations for the other monthly variables. On average, foreign affiliates of
German banks have total assets of e4.8 billion.
A German bank group as a whole (including German headquarters) holds e46 billion
of fixed-income assets, ande959 billion of derivatives for trading on average (in 2014).
Across foreign affiliates the distribution of trading assets is relatively unequal, with
the top decile holding 97.7% of fixed-income assets (in 2014; the share for derivatives is
even higher). In fact, 33% of affiliates hold no trading assets.14 Conditional on holding
trading assets at all, the average affiliate has fixed-income trading assets worthe1,250
million, and trading derivatives worth e7,415 million (in 2014).
1.5 Evidence on Fixed-Income Trading Assets
1.5.1 Case Study
We first consider some illustrative evidence from the United Kingdom. The United
Kingdom started a series of annual corporate tax rate cuts in 2011. In a first step, it cut
the corporate tax rate from 28% to 26% in April 2011, and already announced further
cuts (BBC, 2011). As the United Kingdom is the largest foreign country in which
German banks hold trading assets (see Table 1.1), these tax rate cuts lend themselves
toacase study.15 In this case study, we trackhowfixed-incometradingassetsdeveloped
in the United Kingdom after the tax rate cut, compared to other countries.
To investigate how proprietary trading in German bank affiliates in the United King-
dom responded to the tax rate cut, we evaluate the time trend in total fixed income
trading assets relative to GDP held by German banks in the United Kingdom. As a
counterfactual we construct a synthetic control country for the United Kingdom as
14If we exclude these affiliates from our analysis, we obtain similar results.
15A potential worry with this case study may be that London is such an exceptional location
for banks that results from the United Kingdom are not representative. While this may be the
case, it does fulfill the purpose of the case study in showing that trading assets respond to tax
rate cuts. To ensure that the United Kingdom is not driving our results, we re-estimate the main
regressions also without the United Kingdom (see below).
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suggested by Abadie et al. (2010), based on trading assets/GDP in the pre-treatment
period. In the donor pool there are all countries in which at least three German multi-
national banks have affiliates.16 Figure 1.3 shows time trends in these variables for
the United Kingdom and the synthetic control country. While trading assets in the
United Kingdom increased after the tax rate cut in April 2011, the volume of trading
assets in the synthetic control declined until the series went back to the common trend
in September 2011.
Figure 1.3: Trading Assets/GDP in the UK and in a Synthetic UK
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man bank affiliates in the United Kingdom. The blue line shows the time trend
of the same variable of a synthetic control for the United Kingdom. Series are
normalized (04/2011 = 1) due to confidentiality requirements. Source: Deutsche
Bundesbank (2015a).
In Figure 1.4, we carry out a placebo test to show that the difference between the
United Kingdom and its synthetic control is unlikely to arise by chance. In the placebo
test, we run the same analysis using the other countries in the donor pool as treated
countries. Due to the confidentiality restrictions of the Bundesbank, we can carry
out this analysis only for countries in which more than three German bank groups
have subsidiaries or branches. The dark line in Figure 1.4 again depicts the difference
in trading assets/GDP between the United Kingdom and its synthetic control; the
grey lines show the same analysis for the other countries in the donor pool. In these
countries we cannot find a similar increase in trading assets relative to the respective
synthetic control country, confirming that the higher levels of trading assets in the
United Kingdom after April 2011 are likely caused by the lower tax rate.
16The resulting synthetic control country for the United Kingdom consists of 96% Hong Kong
and 4% Singapore.
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Figure 1.4: Impact on Trading Assets/GDP Relative to Synthetic Controls
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sets / GDP between German bank affiliates in the United Kingdom and affiliates
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Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (2015a).
This case study on the British corporate tax rate cut in April 2011 therefore illustrates
our hypothesis that banks adjust the location of their proprietary trading activities in
response to changes in taxation. We next provide broader evidence for this relation-
ship.
1.5.2 Empirical Strategy
1.5.2.1 Test of Hypothesis 1
In our first hypothesis, we proposed that more trading takes place in low-tax affiliates.
To test this relation, we look at the variation in tax rates that different affiliates of a
multinational bank face. Accordingly, we estimate the following equation:
IHS(Trading Assetsijkt) = β0 + β1CTRjt + β2Xijkt + δk + γt + φj + uijkt. (1.1)
The dependent variable, IHS(Trading Assetsijkt) is the inverse hyperbolic sine of
fixed-income trading assets held by affiliate i of bank-group k in country j as of year-
month t. The inverse hyperbolic sine transformation can be interpreted just like the
logarithmic transformation, buthas theadvantage that it is alsodefinedat zero (and for
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negative values).17 The main explanatory variable of interest is CTRjt, the statutory
corporate tax rate of country j. We additionally use several control variables Xijkt,
discussed below. δk are bank-group fixed effects, γt are monthly time fixed effects, and
φj are country fixed effects. If Hypothesis 1 holds, we should observe β1 < 0, as banks
prefer low-tax countries to conduct their proprietary trading.
We first estimate equation (1.1) without country fixed effects. This estimation has the
advantage that countries with 0% corporate tax rates during the whole sample period
also contribute variation to the estimation. Previous literature has shown that a lot
of profit shifting is towards such zero-tax countries, and that shifting elasticities may
be underestimated when ignoring these countries (Davies et al., 2018).
However, a potential threat to identifying a causal effect in these cross-country re-
gressions is that country characteristics other than the tax rate determine a country’s
attractiveness for proprietary trading. To address this concern, we use two strategies.
First, we include country fixed effects in the main regression to control for time-
constant country characteristics. Note, however, that our sample is relatively short,
and identification in this specification is thus based on relatively few tax rate changes.18
Second, we use a selection model, which explicitly estimates the attractiveness of each
country for proprietary trading (discussed below). In addition, we employ several
time-varying country-level control variables.
In particular, we control for the inverse hyperbolic sine of GDP as a proxy for country
size, as larger countries also provide a larger market for raising funds that banks can use
for proprietary trading. We also include inflation rates, as higher inflation can on the
one hand discourage trading activities in a country because of higher risk premiums,
and on the other hand make alternative capital investments at fixed nominal interest
rates less attractive (lowering opportunity costs of proprietary trading). We control
for GDP growth as countries that grow at higher rates offer more attractive markets
for banks. We include the share of country j’s financial sector in the gross value added
to account for the attractiveness of financial centers as the location of proprietary
17The inverse hyperbolic sine transformation is IHS(y) = ln
(
yi +
(
y2i + 1
)0.5)
, which is ap-
proximately equal to ln 2yi = ln 2 + ln yi (except for very small values of yi). It is suited for the
transformation of dependent variables and allows consistent estimation of the regression equation
(MacKinnon and Magee, 1990; Burbidge et al., 1988).
18In total, there are 52 changes in statutory tax rates in our sample. However, none of the tax
havens in our sample changed its tax rate.
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trading.19 We also include an index on the regulation of securities activities based on
the World Bank survey on bank regulation in 2011 (World Bank, 2011). It measures the
extent to which banks may engage in underwriting, brokering and dealing in securities,
and takes on values between 1 (unrestricted) and 4 (prohibited). As this regulatory
measure is time-invariant, we include it only in the regressions without country fixed
effects. Appendix A.2 provides detailed information on variable definitions and data
sources.
To allow for a more precise estimation, we also include the inverse hyperbolic sine of
total assets as a bank-level control variable to account for an affiliate’s size. Moreover,
we control for the inverse hyperbolic sine of the bank group’s overall total assets. This
variable absorbs time-variant shocks that influence the whole bank group, such as large
indemnity payments. Moreover, we include a dummy describing whether an affiliate
is a subsidiary (a separate legal entity) or a branch (an office of the parent company)
Our second strategy to control for the attractiveness of countries is to estimate a selec-
tion model using a two-stage estimator. We use the estimator proposed by Wooldridge
(1995), which extends the Heckman (1976) selection model to panel data. We are able
to do so as our sample includes all subsidiaries and branches of German banks.20
This estimation strategy explicitly controls for banks strategically locating their sub-
sidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions.21 In more detail, we proceed as follows: In the first
step, we estimate the selection model using a probit specification. As additional vari-
ables in the first stage we use the inverse hyperbolic sines of the total assets of the
parent and the population of the host country. In the second step, we use the pre-
dictions from the probit regression to construct additional explanatory variables (the
inverse Mills ratios interacted with monthly time dummies), which capture the likeli-
hood that a bank group will have subsidiaries or branches in a particular location in the
respective month. In the last step, we estimate our main model with these additional
explanatory variables.
19We use the share of financial and insurance activities in total gross value added. This measure
reflects the role of important financial centers: In 2014, for instance, it is 8% in the United Kingdom
and 13% in Singapore, compared to 4% in Germany and 4% in France.
20Sample selection models are rarely used in the profit shifting literature, as this literature
usually uses datasets that have incomplete samples (e.g. Orbis, Amadeus) or that are limited
by size-based reporting requirements (e.g. MiDi). Huizinga et al. (2014) are an exception, they
employ a Heckman selection model to estimate banks’ pre-tax profit response to corporate tax
rates.
21Huizinga and Voget (2009) show that international tax liabilities matter for M&A and thus
for the structure of multinational firms.
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1.5.2.2 Test of Hypothesis 2
Next, we test whether the relocation of proprietary trading is mostly a shifting of book
profits or the result of the relocation of real activities. As an indicator for real activity
we use employment in the affiliate.
Our second hypothesis predicts that an increase in trading activities in response to a
tax rate decrease takes place without additional employees. To test this hypothesis,
we use the following model:
IHS
(
Employeesijkt
)
= β0 + β1IHS(Tradingijkt) + β2Xijkt + δk + γt + φj + uijkt.
(1.2)
The dependent variable is now IHS
(
Employeesijkt
)
, the inverse hyperbolic sine of the
number of employees in bank affiliate i of bank group k in country j in year t. The other
variables are as defined above. As we observe employees in a different dataset with
annual frequency, we can test Hypothesis 2 only at the year level (thus γt are now year
dummies). As we use country fixed effects, we only use variation in trading assets over
time for identification, and not variation over subsidiaries. This ensures that we indeed
look at potential relocations of trading assets. If Hypothesis 2 is true, we expect an
insignificant coefficient for β1. This would imply that rather than shifting real traders,
banks shift only the bare execution of buying and selling to tax haven affiliates. If banks
relocate real activities when they shift trading assets to low-tax countries, we should
observe a positive and significant coefficient for β1. Note, however, that insignificant
results in these regressions may also indicate insufficient variation over time.
As more employees can also manage more proprietary trading assets, there may be a
reverse causality problem. To address this, we use two instrumental variable estima-
tors. First, we instrument IHS
(
Tradingijkt
)
with the statutory corporate tax rate.
This allows us to isolate the variation in trading assets that comes from changes in
corporate tax rates. While this instrument fits well with our tests of Hypothesis 1,
one may worry that the corporate tax rate could also directly influence the number of
employees. This issue is likely small, as hiring and firing employees takes time. Nev-
ertheless, we also provide evidence with an alternative instrument, namely the sum
of trading assets in the headquarter of affiliate i. Trading assets in the headquarter
should not directly influence employment in a particular affiliate, but are related to the
trading assets in the considered affiliate via the bank group’s overall trading strategy.
Changes in country characteristics that correlate with employment and trading assets
23
Trading Offshore: Evidence on Bank’s Tax Avoidance
are again another threat to identification. As before, we use several country-level
controls to address this threat. We thus again control for the inverse hyperbolic sine
of GDP, for the inflation rate, GDP growth, the share of the financial sector and an
index on the regulation of securities activities.
1.5.3 Regression Results
In this section we present the regression results. Table 1.3 reports the test of the first
hypothesis, where we regress trading assets on the tax rate. Table 1.4 shows the results
regarding the second hypothesis, testing whether banks relocate employees along with
proprietary trading. We bootstrap all standard errors and cluster them by bank group
and country-month-year. This clustering accounts both for shocks that affect the
bank group as a whole (e.g. negative press coverage) and for time-specific shocks in
individual countries (such as new laws that affect all affiliates in the country).
1.5.3.1 Relocation of Proprietary Trading
In Table 1.3, we test the effect of statutory tax rates on fixed-income trading assets. In
column (1) we report results for the specification without country fixed effects to use
the full variation present in the sample. We find a significantly negative coefficient of
-3.747. This coefficient indicates that a one percentage point lower corporate tax rate
implies on average 3.747% more fixed-income assets held for proprietary trading.
Our main specification (column 2) includes country fixed effects to control for unob-
served time-constant country characteristics. We find a similar coefficient (-3.997),
significant at the 10% level. Column (3) reports the results of the selection model. We
find a tax semi-elasticity of -3.658 for fixed-income trading assets. The inverse Mills
ratios are significant on a 10% level for 32 of the 49 months in this sample, implying
that there are selection effects.
One may worry that the United Kingdom alone is driving these results, as London is
the most important banking location in Europe. Table 1 confirms this observation:
German bank groups hold more trading assets in the United Kingdom than in any
other foreign country. To address this issue, we re-estimate our regressions after
dropping affiliates in the United Kingdom from the sample.22 Results are very similar
to the main regressions, with an estimated tax semi-elasticity for fixed-income trading
22The resulting sample includes 15,297 observations from 59 bank groups.
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Table 1.3: Effect of Tax Rates on Fixed-Income Trading Assets
(1) (2) (3)
Wooldridge (1995) selection model X
Corporate tax rate -3.747∗∗∗ -3.997∗ -3.658∗∗∗
(-8.64) (-1.68) (-9.19)
IHS(Total assets) 0.547∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗ 0.525∗∗∗
(36.38) (35.99) (33.70)
IHS(Bank group total assets) 0.804∗∗∗ 0.605∗∗∗ 0.849∗∗∗
(9.06) (7.54) (9.82)
IHS(GDP) 0.248∗∗∗ -1.275∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗
(6.82) (-3.02) (8.88)
Inflation rate 0.241∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗
(7.98) (-5.80) (7.03)
GDP growth 0.130∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(9.59) (4.82) (7.75)
Financial sector share 1.328∗∗ 4.812 2.892∗∗∗
(2.12) (1.03) (4.36)
Regulation 0.983∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗
(15.13) (15.68)
Subsidiary dummy -0.208∗∗ -0.135 -0.214∗∗
(-2.11) (-1.06) (-2.25)
Monthly time FE Yes Yes Yes
Bank group FE Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No Yes No
Observations 16,793 16,793 16,793
R2 0.425 0.547 0.426
Data from External Positions of Banks database of Deutsche Bundesbank (2015a). The
dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine of fixed-income securities held for trad-
ing. Appendix A.2 defines all variables. Monthly bank data for 12/2010-12/2015. t-
statistics in parentheses, based on bootstrapped standard errors clustered by bank group
and by country-month-year.
assets of -4.30 (t-statistic: -10.8) with bank group and time fixed effects, and -11.90
(t-statistic: -4.3) when additionally including country fixed effects. Estimating the
selection model without affiliates in the United Kingdom yields a semi-elasticity of
-4.08 (t-statistic: -9.72).
In all, while the implied tax semi-elasticities are large, similar magnitudes have been
found in other profit shifting contexts, e.g. a tax semi-elasticity for patents of -3.8
(Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012).
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1.5.3.2 Profit Shifting or Shifting of Real Activity?
In Table 1.4, we test whether the strategic relocation of trading assets is due to the
shifting of real activities, or a “profit shifting” strategy where the actual activities
continue to take place in high-tax countries. As described in Section 1.5.2.2, we now use
the number of employees as the dependent variable. As this variable is only available
at an annual basis, the number of observations in Table 1.4 is lower than in Table 1.3.
As we are interested in the employment effects of tax induced variation in trading
assets, we use the corporate tax rate as an instrument for trading assets in columns (1)
and (2). We first test the relationship in a specification without country fixed effects in
column(1). Here, wefindaweakly significantandpositive coefficient for tradingassets.
As we use within bank group variation over different affiliates here, this confirms that
generally more trading assets imply that more employees are needed to conduct this
trading. However, to determine whether a tax-induced relocation of trading assets
accompanies a shifting of the trading personnel, we include country fixed effects in
column (2). We then use variation in trading assets induced by tax rate changes for
identification. We now find an insignificant coefficient for trading assets, which would
support Hypothesis 2. However, the first stage F-statistic indicates a weak instrument
problem in regression (2). Likely, this is the case as we can use only annual data for
this test. As only few countries changed their tax rates in the sample period, there is
insufficient variation over time.
To address the weak instrument problem, we use an alternative instrument in
columns (3) to (6).23 This instrument is the inverse hyperbolic sine of total trad-
ing assets in the German headquarter of the bank group. Columns (3) and (4) present
these results with and without country fixed effects. In both specifications, we now
find an insignificant estimate for the effect of trading assets on employment. More-
over, with country fixed effects the estimated coefficient declines by about half. These
estimates indicate that an increase in trading assets does not necessarily induce an
increase in the number of traders.
In columns (5) and (6) we further analyse the relationship between trading assets and
employment by splitting the sample into low-tax and high-tax countries. We find that
there is no significant relationship in low-tax countries, but in high-tax countries the
23Another concern with the regressions in columns (1) and (2) may be that the corporate tax
rate is not a valid instrument as it could be correlated with the error term. To test for this problem,
we have estimated a reduced form regression of employees on the corporate tax rate and have not
found a significant effect.
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number of employees increases with the volume of trading assets. Hence, more trading
assets imply more traders in high-tax countries, but not in low-tax countries.
Table 1.4: Effects on Real Activity (IHS of Employees)
IV: Corporate tax rate IV: Trading of the headquarter
All All All All Low-tax High-tax
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IHS(Trading) 0.177∗ 0.212 0.128 0.067 0.080 0.171∗∗
(1.69) (0.02) (1.09) (0.56) (0.66) (2.02)
IHS(GDP) 0.303∗∗∗ -0.205 0.338∗∗∗ -0.139 0.266∗∗ 0.750∗∗∗
(4.00) (-0.03) (3.65) (-0.22) (2.54) (8.40)
Inflation rate 0.037 0.002 0.067 0.002 0.045 0.160∗∗
(0.53) (0.00) (0.84) (0.05) (0.55) (2.44)
GDP growth -0.042∗ -0.000 -0.036∗ -0.004 -0.027 -0.045
(-1.93) (-0.00) (-1.71) (-0.22) (-1.38) (-0.79)
Financial sector share -2.984∗∗ 6.304 -2.494∗ 5.997 -4.237∗∗∗ -22.454
(-2.45) (0.02) (-1.80) (0.58) (-2.65) (-1.62)
Regulation -0.313∗∗ -0.274∗∗ -0.022∗ -0.623∗∗
(-2.39) (-2.24) (-1.87) (-2.24)
Subsidiary dummy 1.076∗∗∗ 1.038 1.099∗∗∗ 1.148∗∗∗ 1.207∗∗∗ 0.172
(5.96) (0.18) (6.15) (5.00) (6.95) (0.43)
Year & Bank group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No Yes No Yes No No
First stage F 10.611 0.236 15.373 12.822 9.825 9.185
Observations 1,065 1,064 1,065 1,064 743 320
Centered R2 0.386 0.514 0.422 0.578 0.458 0.466
Data from External Positions of Banks database of Deutsche Bundesbank (2015a,b). The dependent variable
is the inverse hyperbolic sine of the number of employees. All indicates that the sample consists of all foreign
affiliates of German banks. Low-tax refers to affiliates that face a lower tax rate than the German headquarter
(30%) and High-tax refers to the other entities. IHS(Trading) is the inverse hyperbolic sine of fixed-income
trading assets; in columns (1) and (2) it is instrumented by the statutory corporate tax rate and in columns
(3) to (6) it is instrumented by the inverse hyperbolic sine of trading assets in the German headquarter. Yearly
data from 2010 to 2015. t-statistics in parentheses, based on standard errors clustered by bank group and by
country-year.
Taken together these results are in line with our second hypothesis and suggest that a
shifting of trading assets does not lead to more employees, neither in high-tax countries
nor in low-tax countries. As a robustness test, we also confirm these results using two
different samples: First, the Bundesbank data without the United Kingdom, and
second the international Bankscope dataset.
1.5.3.3 Robustness Test with Bankscope Data
As a robustness test, we also re-estimate our regressions using the Bankscope dataset
(see Appendix 3 for details). Using this dataset, we find tax semi-elasticities of trading
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assets between -6.7 and -8.2 using variation across countries. The estimated coeffi-
cients are larger than those in Table 1.3, indicating that German banks are less re-
sponsive to taxation than their international competitors, possibly because Germany
has relatively strict banking regulation and anti-tax avoidance rules. Estimating the
same regressions with country fixed effects, we continue to find negative coefficients,
but statistically not different from zero. Likely, the estimated coefficients are not sig-
nificant as there is little variation over time. The lower quality of the dataset may also
explain why we loose significance.
Wealso test in theBankscope samplewhether real activitiesare relocatedtogetherwith
proprietary trading assets. Regressing a bank affiliate’s personnel expenses on trading
assets and using trading in all other affiliates of the bank group as the instrument, we
find no significant effects for low-tax countries. For high-tax countries the effect is
significant. These results again indicate that the relocation of proprietary trading
should be interpreted as a profit shifting strategy.
In sum, the results using Bankscope data confirm our main results, even though the
Bankscope dataset does not include information on branches, which hold a large share
of trading assets. Appendix 3 discusses these results in more detail.
1.6 Descriptive Evidence on Trading Derivatives
So far we have considered fixed-income trading assets. From December 2013 onwards,
the Bundesbank data also includes information on derivatives held for trading. As
banks hold, on average, far more derivatives than fixed-income trading assets (see
Table 1.2), we now provide some descriptive evidence that banks also relocate trading
derivatives in response to tax rate differentials.
The data on derivatives is only available for December 2013 to December 2015, and
there were only very few tax rate changes during this period. We thus cannot use
country fixed effects. Instead, we present in Table 1.5 descriptive evidence using the
cross-country variation (column 1) and the selection model (column 2).24
In both specifications, the estimated coefficient for the corporate tax rate is significant
and negative. The results indicate tax semi-elasticities between -8.654 and -8.986.
This suggests that derivatives may respond even more strongly to tax rate differentials
24In the selection model, 20 of the 25 inverse Mills ratios are significant, again suggesting that
that selection effects matter in principle, despite the similar coefficients for the tax rate.
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Table 1.5: Effect of Tax Rates on Trading Derivatives
(1) (2)
Wooldridge (1995) selection model x
Corporate tax rate -8.986∗∗∗ -8.654∗∗∗
(-18.65) (-15.88)
IHS(Total assets) 0.738∗∗∗ 0.735∗∗∗
(24.47) (20.01)
IHS(Bank group total assets) -0.315 -0.542∗∗∗
(-1.34) (-5.62)
IHS(GDP) 0.641∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗
(11.85) (13.39)
Inflation rate 0.162∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(5.04) (3.98)
GDP growth 0.106∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(4.52) (3.41)
Financial sector share -6.626∗∗∗ -4.149∗∗∗
(-7.05) (-3.23)
Regulation 0.990∗∗∗ 0.957∗∗∗
(12.94) (12.01)
Subsidiary dummy -1.631∗∗∗ -1.615∗∗∗
(-10.90) (-9.38)
Monthly time FE Yes Yes
Bank group FE Yes Yes
R2 0.565 0.568
Observations 6,460 6,460
Data from External Positions of Banks database of Deutsche Bundes-
bank (2015a). The dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine of
derivatives held for trading. Appendix A.2 defines all variables. Monthly
bank data for 12/2013-12/2015. t-statistics in parentheses, based on boot-
strapped standard errors clustered by bank group and by country-month-
year.
than fixed-income trading assets do. Given that derivatives – as the more risky asset
– should be more profitable than fixed-income trading assets, it is not surprising that
they also respond strongly to profit shifting incentives.
As a robustness check, we again re-estimate this specification without bank affiliates in
the United Kingdom. The estimated tax coefficient of -8.86 (t-statistic: -8.93) confirms
that also our results on trading derivatives are not only driven by this important
financial center.
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1.7 Importance of Proprietary Trading as a Profit
Shifting Channel
The estimated semi-elasticities in Section 1.5.3.1 and 1.6 imply substantial tax effects
on trading assets. How much money do banks save through the relocation of trading
assets? To answer this question, we conduct a back-of-the-envelope calculation of
potential tax savings and apply the estimated elasticities on the observed data of
trading assets. While such a back-of-the-envelope calculation has to rely on many
assumptions and can deliver only a rough estimate, it allows us to get a feeling for the
importance of the profit shifting channel discussed in this essay.
We proceed as follows: We take the estimated tax semi-elasticities in column (1) in
both Table 1.3 and Table 1.5 and estimate the percentage change in trading assets if
the affiliate had paid a tax of 30% (like the German headquarter).25 We then multiply
this percentage change with the actual level of trading assets in each affiliate.26 We
interpret the result as the amount of trading assets that are located in the affiliate
for tax reasons. We then multiply these trading assets with an exogenously chosen
trading profitability. Finally, we multiply these trading gains with the actual tax
rate differential to the German headquarter’s 30% to arrive at an estimate for the tax
savings from the relocated trading assets. Summing up over all affiliates that are taxed
at lower rates than the German headquarter gives an estimate of the taxes a bank saves
via this profit shifting channel.
There are several potential problems with this approach. First, we apply our estimated
semi-elasticities to non-marginal increases in the tax rate. Second, we do not account
for the general equilibrium effects of a hypothetical tax increase in all affiliates that
pay less tax than the German headquarter. Third, we do not know how profitable
the proprietary trading activities are. To address this last point, we carry out the
estimation with different assumed rates of return.
Table 1.6 summarizes the results of this back-of-the-envelope calculation. Assuming
a constant profitability of 1% (a relatively conservative estimate), our calculations
25For better comparability, we use the estimated coefficient from the specification without
country fixed effects also for fixed-income trading assets. As the coefficient is very similar, the
results differ only slightly if we use the coefficient from the estimation with country fixed effects.
Using the smaller coefficient from the regression without country fixed effects yields a slightly more
conservative estimate.
26If our estimated semi-elasticities imply a decline by more than the total volume of trading
assets held in the affiliate, we assume that the affiliate reduces its trading assets to zero.
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suggest tax savings for 2015 ofe450 million from the relocation of fixed-income trading
assets and trading derivatives.27
The profitability of proprietary trading in the real world is certainly not constant
over time. To approximate changes in profitability over time, we re-estimate the tax
savings assuming that profitability equals the growth rate of the MSCI World Index.
The right-hand part of Table 1.6 reports these results. As the return on the MSCI
World Index was negative in 2011, we obtain a negative value for implied tax savings
in 2011 (due to the missed deduction possibilities of trading losses in higher-taxed
affiliates). For 2015, these calculations imply a total tax saving of aboute368 million,
or 4% of banks’ tax payments (e8.4 billion; see Deutsche Bundesbank, 2016a).
Table 1.6: Implied Tax Savings in Million EUR
Exogenous 1% profitability MSCI World growth rate
Fixed-income Trading Fixed-income Trading
Year trading assets derivatives trading assets derivatives
2011 29.543 -2.576
2012 27.928 31.727
2013 23.579 39.269
2014 25.486 262.952 40.148 429.510
2015 30.214 420.768 29.242 339.345
Calculated potential annual tax savings of German multinational banks by relocation
of proprietary trading activities, assuming an exogenous profitability of trading assets
of 1% on the left and a profitability corresponding to the monthly growth rate of the
MSCI World Index on the right.
Several factors affect the development of these tax savings over time: First, the loca-
tion of trading assets changes over time. Second, tax rate differentials change. Figure
1.5 illustrates how the implied potential tax savings per month evolve over time, as-
suming a constant 1% return. As data on trading derivatives begins only in 12/2013,
the second panel captures a shorter time period. While the tax savings due to the re-
location of fixed-income trading assets have remained relatively constant over time,
the strategic location of trading derivatives has gained importance as tax avoidance
channel: Between the start of 2014 and the end of 2015, the tax savings achieved by
strategically locating derivatives held for trading in low-tax countries approximately
doubled.
Tax rate cuts in other countries also contributed to the tax savings of German banks.
27With a 2% return on proprietary trading, the tax savings double.
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Figure 1.5: Implied Monthly Tax Savings
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Illustration of implied monthly tax savings: If all lower taxed affiliates were taxed by 30%, our estimated
semi-elasticities imply a decline in fixed-income trading assets and in trading derivatives in these affiliates.
We calculate the implied tax savings assuming that these trading assets were held in the German headquarter
instead and that they yield a constant rate of return of 1%. The shaded area illustrates the implied tax
savings using the lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence interval of the semi-elasticities estimated in
Table 1.3.
For example, tax rate cuts in the United Kingdom in April in each year in the sample
result in visible increases of the tax savings of German banks.
How much tax revenue does the German government forego due to banks’ relocation of
proprietary trading assets? To answer this question, we multiply the estimated trading
gains with the average German tax rate of 30% (instead of the tax rate differential
between Germany and the country where the trading assets are held). With a 1%
average return on trading assets, the German government lost e1.3 billion in tax
revenues in 2015, or about 16% of the total taxes paid by German banks. If the return
to proprietary trading was 2%, these numbers double.
While these calculations present only a rough estimate and should thus be treated
with caution, they nevertheless show that the strategic location of proprietary trad-
ing activities is a quantitatively important channel for tax avoidance in the financial
sector.28
28Note that we can only calculate tax savings for two specific asset types. As banks can also
use other asset types for proprietary trading (e.g. shares), total tax savings are likely higher.
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1.8 Conclusion
In this essay, we analyze how banks relocate their proprietary trading in response
to corporate taxation. With our preferred data on German multinational banks, we
find in our baseline regressions that a one percentage point lower corporate tax rate
increases fixed-income trading assets held in an affiliate in that country by about
4.0%, and trading derivatives by about 9.0%. Our results are qualitatively robust to
estimation with more international data from Bankscope. Moreover, we find evidence
that the increase mainly stems from an ‘artificial’ shifting of trading activities: Banks
transfer only trading assets to lower-taxed affiliates, not employees.
Our results show that proprietary trading is very mobile. It responds very strongly
to tax rate differentials. Thus, it is likely also highly responsive to non-tax incentives,
e.g. regulatory differences. Regulators need to take these results into account: If a
new regulation on proprietary trading only shifts activities abroad, it may not fulfill its
aims. The high mobility of proprietary trading supports the call for an internationally
harmonized banking regulation.
Future research could expand our work in several ways. First, it would be interesting
to know more on the types of assets that banks hold for proprietary trading in low-tax
countries. The Bundesbank data only provides information on fixed-income trading
assets and on trading derivatives. The information offered in Bankscope on different
types of trading-assets is also very sparse. Second, future work could address whether
the shifting patterns change when a bank or its affiliates make losses.
33
Chapter 2
Avoiding Taxes: Banks’ Use of
Internal Debt
2.1 Introduction
The fight against profit shifting has been a major policy issue in recent years. The
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimates that
profit shifting causes tax revenue losses amounting to 4% to 10% of global corporate in-
come tax revenues (OECD, 2015). Facing this substantial impact on public treasuries,
the member countries have continually implemented countermeasures proposed in the
OECD/G20 action plan on base erosion and profit shifting (OECD, 2013) into na-
tional legislation. Nevertheless multinationals can still use various legal tax planning
structures. In particular banks have vast opportunities to avoid corporate taxes: Ox-
fam (2017) shows that the European Union’s top 20 banks report 26% of their profits
in tax havens though employing only 7% of their total workforce there.
There is a substantial empirical literature studying profit shifting and the different
channelsmultinationals canuse to transferprofits to lower taxedaffiliates, butvirtually
all of this literature has left out banks or not considered the special role of the financial
sector. This is particularly striking when it comes to profit shifting via internal credit
relations, which is one of the main channels for profit shifting. It is usually labeled
debt shifting in the literature and works straightforwardly: A multinational group
can shift its capital as equity to affiliates residing in low-tax countries or tax havens.
The idea for this chapter arose in discussions with Dominika Langenmayr. The chapter is based
on Reiter (2017).
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The low-tax affiliate then lends money to other, high-taxed affiliates. As the related
interest payments are tax-deductible in the high-tax country, profits are shifted to
the affiliate where they are taxed at a lower rate. The resulting tax saving equals the
tax rate differential times the interest payment. While there is consistent evidence on
internal debt shifting in non-financial sectors, to my knowledge there is no study that
investigates the extent of internal debt shifting in the banking sector.
Banks are likely to use debt shifting more aggressively than other multinationals be-
cause of three reasons: First, leverages of banks are much higher than leverages of
other companies. This additional debt capacity allows also for a more intensive use of
internal debt. Second, several countries exempt banking income from their controlled-
foreign-corporation (CFC) rules that should prevent profit shifting. Germany, for in-
stance, does not use CFC rules towards banks if they meet some lax conditions. And
third, as the profit maximizing optimization of financial transactions is a bank’s core
business, the expertise in tax planning is probably much greater in banks than in other
multinationals. Whereas firms in other sectors often purchase tax advisory services
from consultancy companies, banks already have a substantial tax planning expertise
within the group.
In this essay I show that banks indeed use internal debt for profit shifting more ag-
gressively than non-financial firms do. My analysis uses the External Positions of
Banks database provided by the German central bank, a comprehensive administra-
tive dataset of high quality to which all German multinational banks and their foreign
subsidiaries and branches are obliged to report. I find significant evidence for internal
debt shifting, with a ten percentage points higher corporate tax rate leading to an in-
crease in the internal leverage of about 4.95 percentage points. This absolute response
is more than twice the effect that Fuest et al. (2011) and Buettner et al. (2012) find for
non-banks. These two studies are directly comparable to my work as they use an anal-
ogous setting and dataset. They find that a ten percentage points higher corporate tax
rate increases internal leverages in non-banks by 1.77 to 2.14 percentage points. When
relating these figures to the sample mean of internal leverages (42% in my sample, 23%
and 28% in these previous studies on German non-banks), my results correspond to
an increase by about 12%, compared to 7% to 8% for non-banks. These comparisons
show that the financial sector uses internal debt shifting more aggressively than other
sectors of the economy.
Moreover this essay discusses the use of conduit entities in internal debt financing. In
such conduit entities loans are simply passed through without shifting any profits out
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of the affiliate. There are three potential reasons why multinationals might use such
conduit affiliates: The pass-through loans offer an additional profit shifting possibility
by mispricing of the related interest rates. Second, the conduit entities might simply
serve as financial hubs in internal financing. And third, passing loans through an ad-
ditional affiliate also impedes the uncovering of the tax avoidance scheme, for instance
by the media. However, classical debt shifting regressions use internal gross liabilities
as proxy for the volume of internal debt shifting and therefore inaccurately measure
debt shifting if the location of these conduit entities correlates with tax rates. In the
sample of German multinational banks I show that conduit entities are systematically
located in low-tax countries. To account for the potential bias, I use a new dependent
variable that captures internal liabilities net of internal claims relative to total assets
(if positive, zero otherwise). I show that taking account of this bias increases the sen-
sitivity of internal debt to the tax rate further: The estimated tax coefficient rises
whereas the sample mean of the internal-net-debt ratio is substantially lower at 28%.
More precisely, a ten percentage points higher corporate tax rate raises this internal-
net-debt ratio by 5.63 percentage points, which corresponds to an increase by 20% at
the mean.
In accounting for conduit entities and subtracting conduit debt in the dependent
variable, I furthermore make a more general methodological point on profit shifting
literature: As also non-financial multinationals might use conduit affiliates in internal
debt financing, previous regressions using the internal-gross-liabilities-to-total-assets
ratio as dependent variable are potentially also affected by a biased estimation of
internal debt shifting.
The literature on profit shifting has been so far almost exclusively confined to the
non-financial sector. Fuest et al. (2011), Møen et al. (2011), Buettner et al. (2012),
Buettner and Wamser (2013), Blouin et al. (2014) and Egger et al. (2014) find internal
debt responsesofnon-financialmultinationalsusingvarious econometric specifications
or datasets. The work of Overesch and Wamser (2014) is the only study so far that
uses bilateral internal debt data and finds significantly positive effects of the precise
bilateral tax rate differential (which is probably the most precise measure for debt
shifting incentives). The dataset used in this essay similarly allows a bilateral analysis,
and I find much larger effects on internal leverages for German bank affiliates also at
the bilateral level.
Moreover, some papers infer evidence for internal debt shifting from regressing overall-
liabilities-to-total-assets ratios on the difference between the tax rate an affiliate faces
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and the groups’ average tax rate (e.g. Gu et al. (2015) for the banking sector and
Huizinga et al. (2008) for multinationals in general). As they cannot distinguish
between internal and external debt they also cannot break down this effect to internal
debt shifting and the classical debt financing incentive generated by high tax rates due
to the deductibility of interest expenses. Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017) also use
data on overall liabilities and investigate whether the debt response to corporate taxes
differs between banks and non-banks.
Some recent papers study tax-induced profit shifting in the banking sector. Merz and
Overesch (2016) show in a worldwide sample of bank affiliates that corporate tax rates
negatively affect reported pre-tax profits, indicating that banks indeed engage in profit
shifting. However, they cannot identify precise profit shifting channels, but they find
some suggestive evidence that internal debt shifting might play a role. Langenmayr
andReiter (2017) identifyanotherpotential channelby showing thatbanks shift profits
through the relocation of proprietary trading assets to lower taxed affiliates.
The next section discusses relevant institutional issues and the role of conduit enti-
ties. Section 2.3 presents the empirical specification that I use for identification. In
Section 2.4 I describe the dataset and provide descriptive evidence for debt shifting.
Then Section 2.5 presents the regression results. Finally Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Debt Shifting in the Banking Sector
While there is consistent evidence in the literature on debt shifting by non-financial
multinationals, the financial sector can use this tax avoidance channel even more
strongly: The immaterial nature of the banking business and the institutional envi-
ronment in many countries facilitate the use of large amounts of internal debt tailored
to shift profits to lower taxed affiliates. This environment is outlined in the follow-
ing section. Moreover, previous studies on debt shifting have not considered the role
of conduit entities. As they are particularly important in the banking sector, Sec-
tion 2.2.2 discusses their influence on the empirical identification of debt shifting.
2.2.1 Institutional Background
Financing in the banking sector relies heavily on debt, with banks usually having low
stocks of equity relative to the amount of debt they use. The Bank for International
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Settlements reports an equity-to-total-assets ratio of only 6.9% for banks worldwide
in 2015 (Bank for International Settlements, 2017). German banks, constituting the
sample in this essay, had on average an equity-to-total-assets ratio of only 7.0% in 2015,
compared to 28.2% in the non-financial sector (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2016b). Berg
and Gider (2017) find that mainly different asset risks can explain this capitalization
gap between banks and non-banks. However, the seemingly higher debt capacity in the
banking sector also provides additional scope for internal debt financing. Moreover,
bank regulation does not require an upper limit on the use of debt financing so far.
In course of Basel III, a compulsory minimum equity-to-total-assets ratio of 3% (with
variable mark-ups for globally systemically relevant banks) should be implemented.
Since January 1, 2015 banks have to disclose this ratio, the adoption as a mandatory
requirement is planned to be introduced in 2018. Hence, so far there is no regulatory
limitation to the use of internal debt.1
Apart from this, several countries implemented controlled-foreign-corporation (CFC)
rules that add passive income (e.g. interest income) in low-taxed affiliates to the tax
base of the parent company (see e.g. Ruf and Weichenrieder, 2012), allowing for a tax
credit for the taxes already paid abroad. If binding, these rules would prevent debt
shifting. However, some countries such as e.g. Japan, the United Kingdom and the
United States completely or in large part exclude income from banking from being
affected by CFC rules. Also Germany, the home country of all multinational banks
in the sample used in this essay, completely excludes income from banking under the
relatively loose condition of having a ‘commercially organized business operation’ in
the low-tax country.2 This exclusion of banks from CFC legislation in some major
countries provides additional scope for debt shifting compared to multinationals in
other sectors.
Another regulatory issue that might affect debt shifting in the banking sector is the
implementation of bank levies in several countries in the aftermath of the financial
crisis. In most countries also internal liabilities are subject to the levy, increasing the
costs of debt shifting. Germany introduced a bank levy in 2011 with progressive tax
rates. However, there is a levy exempt amount of 300 million euros and Buch et al.
1For a discussion of the Basel III compulsory minimum equity-to-total-assets ratio requirement
see Dermine (2015).
2The German Federal Fiscal Court decided in 2010 that it is not even necessary that the
foreign affiliate has employees or offices to fulfill the condition of a ‘commercially organized business
operation’ (BFH 13 Oct 2010, I R 61/09); having a service contract with another affiliate is already
sufficient.
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(2016) show that 77% of all German banks are therefore exempt from levy payments.
Comparing the relatively low bank levy rates (also in other countries, see Devereux
et al. (2017) for an overview) to the potential tax savings from internal debt and the
exemption of the majority of banks suggest that the German levy does not affect
debt shifting substantially. Furthermore, since the adoption of European bank levy
standards in 2015 there is even a special treatment that reduces bank levy rates on
intragroup liabilities by half.
Taken together, the regulatory environment, the immaterial nature of the banking
business, and the common high leverages in the financial sector suggest that banks use
internal debt shifting more intensively than multinationals from other sectors do.3
2.2.2 The Role of Conduit Entities
A threat to the empirical identification of internal debt shifting are conduit entities
that simply pass through liabilities, by taking up a loan from a related affiliate and
passing it as a loan to another affiliate. As in these conduit affiliates interest income
from conduit claims offsets interest expenses due to conduit liabilities, using internal
gross liabilities as proxy for profits shifted out through internal debt leads to biased
estimates. Nevertheless, previous empirical studies on debt shifting have not consid-
ered the existence of conduit entities and its potential impact on the estimation of debt
shifting so far.
This essay accounts for conduit entities in internal debt financing. I define conduit
affiliates as entities that simply pass-through debt from one related affiliate to another
affiliate. Figure 2.1 illustrates the simplest example of such an internal conduit debt
scheme: The tax haven affiliate faces a corporate tax rate equal to tHa and lends
KC units of money to the conduit affiliate which is taxed by tC > tHa. Through
the related interest payments profits are shifted from the conduit affiliate to the tax
haven affiliate. Moreover, also the headquarter wants to lendKHQ from the tax haven
affiliate. Instead of directly taking out a loan from the haven affiliate, it can pass-
3Formally, the negative inter-bank market rates that arose for certain funds in 2015 could
reverse the debt shifting incentives as internal loans have to be priced according to the arm’s
length principle. Nevertheless, I do not expect that negative interest rates have substantially
affected debt shifting behavior of multinational banks so far: Banks have some discretionary
powers for overpricing internal loans and they might also choose longer term periods to justify
higher interest rates. The sample period in my regressions is from June 2010 to December 2015.
As a robustness check I also estimated my regressions excluding all observations in 2015 from the
sample and arrived at very similar results.
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through this loan via the conduit affiliate. In the headquarter the interest payments
forKHQ are tax-deductible. In the conduit entity the pass-through is completely tax-
neutral (given that the loans are subject to the same interest rates) as interest expenses
to the haven affiliate offset the interest income from the headquarter. In the tax haven
affiliate interest income is taxed at rate tHa < tHQ. Hence, from a tax perspective,
taking out the loan through the conduit entity is equivalent to direct lending.
Figure 2.1: Conduit Affiliate in Internal Debt Financing
  HQ 
(tHQ) 
  
KHQ 
KC + KHQ 
 
Conduit 
(tC) 
Haven 
(tHa) 
However, there might be some reasons why multinationals use such conduit entities
in internal debt financing. First, additional debt streams offer additional scope for
mispricing of internal loans. This form of transfer pricing is a profit shifting channel
different from internal debt shifting and is not the subject of this essay. Second, pass-
ing internal debt through conduit subsidiaries can simply reflect real structures: the
conduit entity can serve as a financial hub that plays the role of a capital coordinator
for the group and distributes capital from tax havens to affiliates. This also allows to
re-bundle debt, for instance by taking out loans from several low-taxed subsidiaries
and distribute them to several high-taxed affiliates through the hub. Third, multina-
tionals might also use conduit entities to conceal the real origin of internal loans. As
tax avoidance schemes of several multinationals were recently addressed in the me-
dia, multinationals might be interested in making these schemes increasingly opaque,
although they are legal.
How does the use of conduit subsidiaries affect the estimation of internal debt re-
sponses to tax rates? In the simple example in Figure 2.1, passing KHQ through the
conduit affiliate increases the internal debt levels of both the conduit affiliate and the
headquarter. HoweverKHQ does not shift any profit out of the conduit affiliate. This
double-counting of internal debt in conduit entities effectively assigns too high inter-
nal debt levels to these intermediary affiliates. If the location of the conduit entities
is correlated with tax rates, this leads to a bias in classical debt shifting regressions
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employed by previous literature. In Section 2.3.2 I elaborate on the sign of this bias.
Apart from internal debt shifting, some studies consider the use of conduit entities
by multinationals in several contexts. Mintz (2004) models that multinationals give
equity to a low-taxed conduit entity which then passes the capital as a loan to another
higher-taxed affiliate. While the first transaction in most countries is not related with
profit shifting (as dividends are usually largely tax-exempt), the loan shifts profits from
the high-taxed affiliate to the lower-taxed conduit entity. Johannesen (2014) models
how conduit entities can be used for cross-border hybrid instruments intended to avoid
taxes. Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010) empirically investigate factors determining
why multinationals might use intermediate entities for investing in their subsidiaries.
In the same direction, Garcia-Bernardo et al. (2017) identify five countries that are
most important for such passing-through of investments. Dyreng et al. (2015) find
that U.S. multinationals systematically supply equity to their subsidiaries through
conduit entities located in countries with low taxes on equity distributions. Literature
on internal debt shifting so far has not considered the use of conduit entities.
2.3 Empirical Specification
This section develops the baseline empirical specification that is employed to estimate
internal debt shifting, first with the classical dependent variable used in previous
literature and afterwards with the new variable that accounts for conduit debt. In
Section 2.3.3 I then adopt the empirical specification to bilateral internal debt data.
2.3.1 Baseline Model
Analogously to previous literature on internal debt shifting in non-financial sectors,
I estimate the effect of corporate tax rates on internal leverages of affiliates, using
variation in tax rates within a multinational bank group across countries and across
time. Accordingly, the baseline regression equation writes:
InternalLiabilitiesikt
TAikt
= β0 + β1CTRikt + β2Xikt + γt + δk + uikt (2.1)
where InternalLiabilitiesikt are internal liabilities in affiliate i of bank group k in
period t. TAikt are total assets. CTRikt is the statutory corporate income tax rate
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affecting affiliate i andXikt is a vector of control variables described below. γt are time
fixed effects, δk are bank group fixed effects and uikt is the error term. If multinational
banks indeed shift profits via internal debt, I expect a positive estimate for β1.
To capture the size of an affiliate, I include the inverse hyperbolic sine of total assets
as a bank-specific control variable intoXit. Similar to the logarithmic transformation
the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) allows to interpret the estimated coefficients as semi-
elasticities, but unlike the logarithm it is also defined for zero and negative values.4
As the magnitude of a bank group’s engagement in a country and thereby also the use
of internal debt might be influenced by macroeconomic variables, I further control for
GDP growth, consumer price inflation rates and the inverse hyperbolic sine of the host
country’s nominal GDP. A further control is a country’s share of the financial sector in
its gross value added which should account for countries that act as important financial
centers.
Moreover I include two regulatory variables that potentially influence a bank group’s
activities and financing decisions in a country: First I incorporate the minimum reg-
ulatory capital requirement for banks and second I control for the capital regulatory
index that is provided by Barth et al. (2013) based on the World Bank (2011) survey
on bank regulation. This index captures whether a country’s capital requirement is
adjusted for individual risk of banks, whether the regulatory capital is adjusted for
certain market value losses, and whether certain funds may be used to capitalize a
bank. It ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating greater stringency of capi-
tal regulation. Another issue with the sample in this chapter is that all bank groups are
headquartered in Germany. As profit shifting is found to be less intense out of head-
quarters (see Dischinger et al., 2014a), as a robustness check I also exclude all German
headquarters from the sample and re-estimate the regressions. The results I find are
very similar.
2.3.2 Accounting for Conduit Entities
As outlined in Section 2.2.2, the simple internal-liabilities-to-total-assets ratio also
includes conduit liabilities that are only passed-through and hence do not reflect actual
profit shifting. To solely capture internal debt that effectively shifts profits out of the
respective affiliate, we have to subtract such pass-through loans: The ratio of internal
4The inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) is defined as sinh−1(x) = log(x+(x2+1)0.5). For a discussion
of the advantages of transforming dependent variables by IHS see Burbidge et al. (1988).
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debt net of pass-through loans divided by i’s total assets is the appropriate measure
for debt shifting out of affiliate i. A straightforward debt shifting regression with this
ratio as dependent variable writes
InternalDebt∗ikt
TAikt
= β0 + β1CTRikt + β2Xikt + γt + δk + uikt . (2.2)
Here InternalDebt∗ikt denotes internal debt net of pass-through loans. TAikt are total
assets held in affiliate i of bank group k, CTRikt is the corporate tax rate, Xikt is a
vector of control variables and uikt is the error term. However, usual internal debt
shifting regressions (like regression equation (2.1)) do not subtract pass-through loans
in the dependent variable: The common dependent variable is InternalLiabilitiesikt
TAikt
=
InternalDebt∗ikt+eikt
TAikt
, where eikt is debt that is passed through to other affiliates. The
regressions therefore estimate
InternalLiabilitiesikt
TAikt
= β0 + β1CTRikt + β2Xikt + γt + δk + uikt +
eikt
TAikt
. (2.3)
If the choice of the conduit affiliate’s location is correlated with the corporate tax rate,
there is a bias in the estimate for β1 similar to the bias that arises with a systematic
measurement error in the dependent variable. As pass-through debt always increases
the amount of internal gross liabilities, the correlation between the dependent variable
in equation (2.3) and eikt
TAikt
is positive by definition. Therefore, the sign of the bias
is equal to the sign of the covariance between eikt
TAikt
(the ‘left-out variable’ here) and
CTRikt:
Cov(CTRit,
eit
TAit
) =
1
T
1
N
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
(CTRit ∗ eit
TAit
)− CTR ∗ 1
T
1
N
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
(
eit
TAit
) ,
(2.4)
whereN is the number of affiliates, T is the number of sample periods andCTR is the
sample mean ofCTRit. For the sake of brevity I drop the bank group indicator k from
here, as it is fully included in the bank indicator i. In all subsidiaries that do not serve
as conduit entities eit is equal to zero. Therefore one can rewrite (2.4):
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Cov(CTRit,
eit
TAit
) =
1
T
1
N
T∑
t=1
H∑
i=1
(CTRit ∗ eit
TAit
)− CTR ∗ 1
T
1
N
T∑
t=1
H∑
i=1
(
eit
TAit
) ,
(2.5)
where subsidiaries i = 1, ..., H (with H ≤ N) serve as conduit affiliates. Rearranging
gives:
Cov(CTRit,
eit
TAit
) =
1
T
1
N
T∑
t=1
H∑
i=1
[
(CTRit − CTR) ∗ eit
TAit
)
]
(2.6)
Equation (2.6) is negative if the weighted average tax rate of conduit affiliates is lower
than the average tax rate of all affiliates in the sample, with weights being equal to
pass-through-debt-to-total-assets ratio eit
TAit
. Hence if conduit entities systematically
face lower tax rates than the average of affiliates, classical debt shifting regressions
estimate a downward biased coefficient for the corporate tax rate. If conduit entities
are, vice versa, located in higher taxed affiliates, there is an upward bias in estimates for
β1 in equation (2.3). As Section 2.4.2 shows, banks in my sample locate their conduit
entities systematically in low-tax countries, resulting in a downward biased estimate
for β1 when using the classical dependent variable.
To account for the use of conduit affiliates in internal debt financing I additionally
use internal net debt (relative to total assets) as dependent variable. This variable is
defined as
IntNetDebtikt = max(InternalLiabilitiesikt − InternalClaimsikt ; 0) , (2.7)
where InternalLiabilitiesikt denotes affiliate i’s internal liabilities and
InternalClaimsikt are claims to related parties of bank group k in period t. There-
fore the difference is the effective amount of internal debt that shifts profits out of
affiliate i, accounting for the potential existence of conduit debt. If internal claims of
an affiliate are larger than its internal liabilities, effectively no profits are shifted out
via the internal debt channel and IntNetDebtikt is zero. The empirical specification
for estimation with the ratio of IntNetDebtikt to total assets as dependent variable is
equivalent to equation (2.1):
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IntNetDebtikt
TAikt
= β0 + β1CTRikt + β2Xikt + γt + δk + uikt . (2.8)
The explanatory variables are as defined in Section 2.3.1. With internal debt shifting I
expect a negative estimate for β1 in equation (2.8). As argued above, the estimated tax
rate coefficient is expected to be higher with internal net debt as dependent variable
compared to internal liabilities if the conduit entities are located in low-tax countries,
and to be lower if conduit affiliates are located in high-tax countries. As a robust-
ness check I again re-estimate equation (2.8) with exclusion of German headquarters
to account for the sample’s idiosyncracy that all bank groups are headquartered in
Germany.
Another issue is that country characteristics other than the corporate tax rate influence
abankaffiliate’s volumeof internalnetdebt. Toaccount for this, I conducta robustness
check by additionally including bank affiliate fixed effects into regression equation
(2.8). I then only exploit corporate tax rate changes in the sample period to identify
the tax effect on internal debt, measuring basically how banks adjust the volume of
effectively profit-shifting debt to changes in the corporate tax rate.
2.3.3 Bilateral Regressions
Starting from June 2014, the External Positions of Banks database of the Deutsche
Bundesbank (2015a) also splits up internal liabilities and internal loans by the country
of the related affiliate from which the loan is taken or to which the loan is given. This
allows to regress bilateral internal net debt on precise bilateral tax rate differentials
that unambiguously identify the tax incentive to shift profits between two affiliates.
For a subset of German non-financial multinationals Overesch and Wamser (2014)
show a positive effect of such precise tax rate differentials on bilateral debt stocks. So
far no study has used bilateral data for estimating debt shifting in banks. Here I use
internal liabilities net of internal claims that affiliate i takes out from related affiliates
in country j as my dependent variable:
IntNetDebtijkt = max(InternalLiabilitiesijkt − InternalClaimsijkt ; 0) , (2.9)
where InternalLiabilitiesijkt are liabilities of affiliate i to other affiliates of the same
bank group k in country j and InternalClaimsijkt are claims of affiliate i to related
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affiliates in country j. I then estimate the following equation for the full sample of
German multinational banks and their foreign affiliates:
IntNetDebtijkt
TAikt
= β0+β1(CTRikt−CTRjkt)+β2Xikt+β3Yjkt+γt+δk+uijkt . (2.10)
The main variable of interest is CTRikt − CTRjkt which denotes the bilateral tax
rate differential between the host country of affiliate i and the country of the internal
creditor j. Xikt is the same vector of control variables as above. Yjkt contains the
macroeconomic control variables also for the internal net creditor’s country. γt are
monthly time fixed effects and δk are bank group fixed effects. uijkt is the error term.
Under the hypothesis that banks shift profits from higher taxed to lower taxed affiliates
via internal debt I expect a positive estimate for β1. Also in this bilateral setting I
include bank affiliate fixed effects as a robustness check.
2.4 Data and Descriptives
2.4.1 Data
I use the External Position of Banks database of the Deutsche Bundesbank (2015a), a
unique dataset provided by the German central bank on assets and liabilities in foreign
affiliates of German multinational banks and in the respective German headquarters.
As this is an administrative dataset to which all German banks with foreign activities
are obliged to report monthly, it provides a complete and high quality sample of all
German multinational banks. I observe separate records for all subsidiaries, whereas
for branches I observe an aggregate figure per bank group and country.
As dependent variable I use internal liabilities held in an affiliate, and internal net debt
which is calculated from internal liabilities and internal claims data. For estimation
of equations (2.1) and (2.8) these variables are available from June 2010 to December
2015 on a monthly basis. More precise data on bilateral internal loans and liabilities,
separated by the country of the internal counterpart, are available from July 2014
until December 2015. Although the sample period for this bilateral data is relatively
short, the variation over affiliate/counterpart’s-country-pairs and over time allows the
estimation of equation (2.10) and an identification of the effect of precise corporate
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tax rate differentials on bilateral internal net debt.
To control for an affiliate’s size, I take the inverse hyperbolic sine of total assets as a
bank-level control variable, which is also taken from the External Positions of Banks
database. I collect the statutory corporate tax rates on a monthly basis from the
Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides of Ernst & Young (2011, 2014). I take country-
level controls from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) International Financial
Statistics, the World Development Indicators of the World Bank, the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) statistics and the online data
center of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). For
some countries I have to complement the data with information provided by national
statistical offices (see Appendix B.1 for an overview of variables and data sources).
As nominal GDP is only available quarterly, I transform it to monthly frequency with
the proportional Denton method for flow series as described in Bloem et al. (2001).
Also the share of the financial sector in a country’s gross value added is only available
with quarterly frequency and I transform it to monthly frequency by cubic spline
interpolation. To calculate annual GDP growth rates with monthly frequency, I use
interpolated GDP values. Minimum capital requirements are taken from the World
Bank (2011) survey on bank regulation. Based on several other questions in this survey,
Barth et al. (2013) provide an index on the stringency of capital regulation. As the
World Bank provided the most recent version of the survey only in 2011, in my sample
these two variables are constant over time. Table 2.1 shows the basic descriptive
statistics of all variables.
2.4.2 Descriptive Analysis
Figure 2.2 illustrates the geographical distribution of German bank affiliates.5 Most
affiliates are located in Europe, probably due to the proximity to the home coun-
try and the common regulation in the European banking union that facilitates for-
eign activities. The most important foreign market for German banks is Luxem-
bourg with 42 affiliates, followed by the United Kingdom with 32 affiliates (in 2013).
Outside Europe the United States (20 affiliates) and Singapore (19 affiliates) are
5Note that in the External Positions of Banks database of the Deutsche Bundesbank (2015a)
I observe all subsidiaries of German banks separately. However, I cannot distinguish between
different branches of German banks in a country as there is only one aggregate observation per
bank group, country and month for branches. I therefore count all branches of a bank group in a
country as one single affiliate, whereas all subsidiaries are counted separately.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Frequ.
Aggregate data (06/2010-12/2015)
Internal liabilities / Total assets 22,240 0.422 0.413 0.280 M
Internal net debt / Total assets 22,240 0.281 0.381 0.005 M
Total assets (in million e) 22,240 8,130 32,295 905 M
Statutory corporate tax rate 22,240 0.264 0.073 0.292 M
Nominal GDP (in billion e) 22,240 151 210 92 Q → M
Inflation rate (%) 22,240 1.930 2.515 1.654 M
GDP growth (%) 22,240 2.130 2.757 1.766 Q → M
Financial sector share 22,240 0.090 0.087 0.053 Q → M
Capital requirement 22,240 0.082 0.007 0.080 -
Regulatory index 22,240 6.954 1.732 8.000 -
Bilateral data (07/2014-12/2015)
Bilateral internal net debt / Total assets 107,361 0.019 0.117 0.000 M
Corporate tax rate differential 107,361 0.022 0.100 0.021 M
Internal net debt are internal liabilities net of internal loans if positive and zero otherwise. M and Q indicate
monthly and quarterly frequency, respectively. Quarterly nominal GDP is transformed to monthly frequency with
the proportional Denton method for flow data. Monthly GDP growth is calculated from interpolated GDP values.
Financial sector share denotes the share of the finance and insurance sector in a country’s gross value added.
Monthly frequency is calculated by cubic spline interpolation. Regulatory index is an index for the stringency of
capital regulation in a country, ranging from 0 to 10 (higher values indicating greater stringency). Source: Deutsche
Bundesbank (2015a)
the most important markets. Furthermore, Figure 2.2 illustrates the location of
the top 5 countries for conduit debt, defined as the sum of each bank affiliate’s
min(InternalClaimsit; InternalLiabilitiesit) per country. First note that these most
important conduit countries are distributed around the world, suggesting that they
serve as regional hubs for different world regions in which German banks are active.
Second, three of the five most important conduit countries (Cayman Islands, Luxem-
bourg, Singapore) are classified as tax havens by both Dharmapala and Hines (2009)
and Johannesen and Zucman (2014), and also the United Kingdom (the most impor-
tant conduit country) offers a relatively low tax rate. This already suggests that in the
sample of German multinational banks conduit entities tend to be located in low-tax
countries. The high amount of conduit debt in the United States probably reflects the
important role of this financial market. Note that also conduit entities in the United
States may face only low effective tax rates as banks can locate their foreign affiliates
in Delaware, a well known domestic tax haven in the United States.6
6I do not observe precise locations of bank affiliates in a country. Therefore this study assigns
to each affiliate in the United States the relatively high US corporate tax rate, although affiliates
might be located in a domestic tax haven such as Delaware. If influencing my results, this leads
to an underestimation of internal debt shifting.
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Figure 2.2: German Bank Affiliates and Top 5 Conduit Countries in 2013
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Sum of conduit debt held by German bank affiliates in a country in parentheses (defined
as min(InternalClaimsit; InternalLiabilitiesit) per affiliate). Calculated from data of
the External Positions of Banks database of Deutsche Bundesbank (2015a).
For a further descriptive investigation of the use of internal debt, Table 2.2 ranks coun-
tries according to the mean of the internal-liabilities-to-total-assets ratios of German
bank affiliates in the respective country in 2013. As expected there are several high-
tax countries at the top: For instance in Japan (having a corporate tax rate of 38.0%
in 2013) German bank affiliates were on average internally debt financed by 88.6%.
Also internal leverages of German bank affiliates in France and Spain (two further
high-tax countries) are on a relatively high level around 80%. Surprisingly also some
tax havens appear in the ranking: In Hong Kong German bank affiliates have a simi-
lar internal leverage as in Portugal, despite the substantially lower corporate tax rate
that would suggest that banks shift profits into affiliates in Hong Kong rather than
out of them. The last column in Table 2.2 explains this finding: It reports for each
country the average conduit share in internal debt that is passed through an affiliate
(formally defined as the country average of min( InternalClaimsit
InternalLiabilitiesit
; 1) in each affili-
ate). In Hong Kong on average 94.9% of internal liabilities are merely passed through
the affiliates, whereas in Portugal the average conduit share is only 25.7%. Hence,
even though German banks have similar internal leverages in both countries, the tax-
effective internal-debt-to-total-assets ratio is substantially higher in Portugal. Also
bank affiliates in Singapore and the Cayman Islands hold similar internal leverages as
affiliates in high-tax countries (e.g. Italy) that can be explained with substantially
larger conduit shares of internal debt.
Both Figure 2.2 and Table 2.2 suggest that the conduit affiliates in the sample of
German multinational banks tend to be located in tax havens and low-tax countries,
implying an underestimation of debt shifting with the classical dependent variable
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Table 2.2: Intragroup Liabilities in 2013
Country CTR IntLiab/TA Conduit share
Japan 38.0% 88.6% 20.8%
France 34.0% 83.8% 22.3%
Spain 30.0% 79.2% 7.7%
United Kingdom 23.0% 75.1% 43.8%
Greece 26.0% 74.4% 38.8%
Hong Kong 16.5% 72.6% 94.9%
Portugal 25.0% 70.9% 25.7%
Sweden 22.0% 70.7% 50.1%
Belgium 34.0% 69.6% 32.1%
Singapore 17.0% 67.0% 59.0%
Italy 40.7% 65.2% 13.1%
Cayman Islands 0.0% 63.2% 68.3%
United States 39.1% 61.1% 36.8%
China 25.0% 57.2% 16.1%
...
Due to confidentiality reasons, only countries with at least 3 affiliates
shown here. CTR denotes a country’s statutory corporate income tax
rate in 2013. Column 3 reports the average gross internal-liabilities-
to-total-assets ratio of German bank affiliates in the respective coun-
try. Column 4 contains the average conduit share of internal debt,
defined as the country average of min( InternalClaimsit
InternalLiabilitiesit
; 1) in each
affiliate. Source: Ernst & Young (2011, 2014) and External Positions
of Banks database of Deutsche Bundesbank (2015a).
(the internal-liabilities-to-total-assets ratio). Regressing the conduit share of internal
debt in an affiliate on the corporate tax rate and controlling for other macroeconomic
variables (see regression results in the Appendix B.2) indeed leads to a significantly
negative tax coefficient. Hence, in the sample used in this essay, the conduit entities
are systematically located in low-tax countries. From a debt shifting perspective this
assigns too high internal liabilities to low-taxed affiliates, leading to an underestima-
tion of internal debt shifting with the classical internal-liabilities-to-total-assets ratio
as dependent variable. I therefore expect a larger tax coefficient with the internal-net-
debt-to-total-assets ratio as dependent variable.
2.5 Results
Table 2.3 shows the baseline estimation results for the determinants of the internal
debt variables in affiliates and headquarters of German multinational banks. As in
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previous studies on debt shifting, in column (1) the dependent variable is the ratio of
internal liabilities to total assets. I find a significantly positive coefficient of 0.495 for
the corporate tax rate, indicating that a 10 percentage points higher corporate tax rate
means an increase in the internal liabilities to total assets ratio by about five percentage
points. At the mean (42.2%) this corresponds to an increase by 12%. This effect of
corporate tax rates on internal liabilities in the banking sector is quantitatively larger
than previous studies estimated for other sectors, both in absolute terms and relative
to the sample mean: Fuest et al. (2011) and Buettner et al. (2012) use an equivalent
setting for data on German multinationals and find a coefficient for the corporate tax
rate of only 0.177 and 0.214, respectively. In relative terms a 10 percentage points tax
rate increase in these studies implies at the sample means (23% and 28%) an increase
in the internal leverage by around 7% to 8%.
The greater impact of tax rates on internal debt in the financial sector even intensifies
if I use internal net debt as the dependent variable in column (2). This variable
reflects the effective amount of debt that shifts profits out of an affiliate. As shown
in the previous section, the reason is that conduit entities in internal debt financing
are mainly located in low-tax countries, resulting in a downward biased estimate of
the tax coefficient when using internal gross liabilities as proxy for debt shifting. The
tax coefficient in column (2) is 0.563, which is about 14% larger than the estimate
in column (1). At the sample mean (28.1%) a 10 percentage points corporate tax
rate increase implies an increase in the internal-net-debt-to-total-assets ratio by 20%.
Previous literature has not analyzed the tax response of internal net debt, therefore
comparability to non-financial sectors is limited in column (2). However, as also non-
banks use conduit entities (e.g. internal financing hubs), accounting for conduit debt
is an interesting extension for future research on debt shifting in non-financial sectors.
In column (3) I additionally include bank affiliate fixed effects. Qualitatively I can
confirm that multinational banks shift profits through the use of internal debt, how-
ever the estimated coefficient is smaller. This may results from the fact that I now
only use tax rate changes for identification, and that the bulk of these tax rate changes
are relatively small tax cuts in high-tax countries. As tax havens (the potential des-
tinations for profits) still offer a much lower tax rate, the qualitative tax incentive for
internal debt structures often remains unchanged, resulting in relatively low adjust-
ments to these changed tax rates. Still the estimated coefficient indicates a strong
response of internal net debt to corporate tax rates: A ten percentage points rise in the
tax rate implies an increase in the internal net debt ratio by 3.24 percentage points,
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Table 2.3: Baseline Intragroup Debt Regressions
Sample: All entities Foreign affiliates
Dep. var.: IntLiab
TA
IntNetDebt
TA
IntLiab
TA
IntNetDebt
TA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CTR 0.495∗ 0.563∗∗ 0.324∗∗ 0.454∗ 0.510∗∗ 0.304∗
(0.271) (0.225) (0.155) (0.266) (0.214) (0.159)
IHS(TA) -0.023∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ -0.004 0.004 0.016∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003)
IHS(GDP) 0.017 -0.002 0.015 0.020 -0.001 0.028
(0.015) (0.012) (0.023) (0.014) (0.011) (0.023)
Inflation -0.007∗ -0.005∗∗ 0.000 -0.013∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
GDP growth -0.009∗ -0.008∗∗ -0.001 -0.010∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
Financial sector share 0.829∗∗∗ 0.078 1.424∗∗∗ 0.445 -0.302 1.574∗∗∗
(0.314) (0.230) (0.248) (0.305) (0.220) (0.247)
Regulatory index -0.018∗∗ -0.004 0.003 0.018∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Capital requirement -0.142 1.056 -0.803 -0.092
(2.737) (1.987) (2.476) (1.816)
Monthly time FE X X X X X X
Bank group FE X X X X X X
Bank FE X X
R2 0.355 0.327 0.795 0.398 0.477 0.777
Observations 22,240 22,240 21,961 16,451 16,451 16,260
Dependent variable is the ratio of internal liabilities to total assets in columns (1) and (4) and the ratio
of internal net debt (internal liabilities net of internal claims if positive, zero otherwise) to total assets in
the other columns. Financial sector share is the share of the banking and insurance sector in a country’s
gross value added. Regulatory index captures the stringency of capital regulation in a country, ranging
from 0 to 10 (higher values indicating greater stringency). Capital requirement is the legal minimum capital
requirement for banks in a country. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by bank and by country-month.
Regressions based on monthly data for 06/2010-12/2015 from the External Positions of Banks database of
Deutsche Bundesbank (2015a).
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corresponding to an increase by about 12% at the sample mean.
Columns (4) to (6) show the results of re-estimating the three specifications with
exclusion of German headquarters. This accounts for the idiosyncrasy of the External
Positions of Banks database that all headquarters reside in Germany, and Dischinger
et al. (2014a) show that multinationals might be reluctant to shift profits away from
headquarters. However I find smaller tax coefficients (0.454, 0.510 and 0.304) when
excluding headquarters from my sample of German multinational banks. There are
two potential explanations for this finding: First, banks might use debt shifting to
substantially shift profits out of their German headquarters. This would be in line
with Tørslov et al. (2017) who show that the share of corporate tax revenues lost due
to profit shifting in Germany is the highest among all European countries. Second,
headquarters partially finance their foreign affiliates with internal debt, leading to a
‘base’ stock of internal debt in these affiliates that does not respond to tax rates and
leads to the smaller estimated responses in regressions (4) to (6).
Resultsoncontrolvariables furthermore showasmallnegativeeffectof anaffiliate’s size
(measured in total assets) on the use of internal debt in the full sample without affiliate
fixed effects, but estimates in the subsample of foreign affiliates are insignificant. When
including affiliate dummies, the effect gets slightly positive. Inflation rates in the host
country have a significantly negative impact on both the internal-gross-liabilities-to-
total-assets ratioandthe internal-net-debt ratio, perhaps reflectinghigher risks. When
including affiliate fixed effects, this effect vanishes. A negative effect also arises from
GDP growth, possibly because banks do not shift funds away from affiliates in fast
growing countries. As expected, the share of the financial sector in a country’s gross
value added has a significantly positive effect on the internal-gross-liabilities-to-total-
assets ratio in regression (1). However, on the internal-net-debt ratio I can only find a
positive effect when including bank affiliate fixed effects.
Table 2.4 shows results of the bilateral debt shifting regressions that allow to use
the precise corporate tax rate differential as measure for the shifting incentive. For
this tax rate differential a significantly positive effect on bilateral-internal-net-debt-
to-total-assets of 0.033 arises in the baseline regression, and of 0.042 when including
affiliate fixed effects. In the subsample of foreign affiliates these effects are even larger:
In regression (3) a coefficient of 0.059 arises, meaning that a 10 percentage points
higher corporate tax rate differential leads to an increase in the bilateral-internal-
net-debt ratio by 0.59 percentage points. Compared to the sample mean (3.2% in
foreign affiliates) this corresponds to an increase by 18%. This result is in line with
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Table 2.4: Bilateral Regression Results
Dep. var.:
IntNetDebtijt
TAi
Sample: All entities Foreign affiliates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CTRit − CTRjt 0.033∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.007) (0.026) (0.010)
IHS(Total assets) -0.009∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
IHS(GDP) host country i 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.005
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006)
counterpart j 0.008∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Inflation rate host country i -0.002∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
counterpart j -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP growth host country i -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
counterpart j -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Regulatory index host country i -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
counterpart j 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Capital requirement host country i 0.453 0.397
(0.279) (0.244)
counterpart j -0.344∗∗∗ -0.281∗∗∗ -0.375∗∗ -0.365∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.023) (0.184) (0.035)
Financial sector share host country i 0.077∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ 0.067∗ -0.161∗∗
(0.038) (0.053) (0.039) (0.063)
counterpart j 0.031∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.045 0.037∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.003) (0.119) (0.006)
Monthly time FE X X X X
Bank group FE X X X X
Bank FE X X
R2 0.078 0.231 0.146 0.241
Observations 107,361 107,361 57,628 57,628
i indicates the affiliate and j the country of the internal counterpart to/from which loans are given/obtained.
IntNetDebtij
TAi
is the ratio of internal liabilities net of internal claims between affiliate i and affiliates of the same
bank group in country j relative to total assets of affiliate i if positive, and zero otherwise. Regulatory index
captures the stringency of capital regulation in a country, ranging from 0 to 10 (higher values indicating greater
stringency). Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by bank-counterpart-pairs and country-month. Monthly
bilateral bank data for 07/2014-12/2015 from the External Positions of Banks database of Deutsche Bundesbank
(2015a).
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banks shifting profits through internal debt from higher taxed to lower taxed affiliates.
Moreover, this implied semi-elasticity also quantitatively confirms the 20% increase in
internalnet leverages (in response toa10percentagepoints corporate tax rate increase)
which I find in Table 2.3. When controlling for affiliate fixed effects in column (4), the
estimated coefficient increases even further to 0.094.
Note that in the bilateral debt regressions in Table 2.4 the estimated tax effect increases
when including bank affiliate dummies, whereas with aggregate internal net debt as
dependent variable in Table 2.3 the tax effect is smaller with bank affiliate dummies.
This implies that internal net debt is highly responsive to changes in the internal
counterpart’s tax rate (the potential destination for profits), whereas banks do not
respond equally strong to changes in the host country’s tax rate.
Results on host country control variables of affiliate i are qualitatively similar to the
estimates for aggregate debt data in Table 2.3. In bilateral regressions I also include
macroeconomic control variables for the country from which the internal net debt is
taken. For the internal counterpart’s country I find a positive effect of the GDP that
probably comes from the fact that German banks partially finance a stronger engage-
ment in large countries through internal debt. Interestingly the capital requirement in
the internal counterpart’s country has a significantly negative effect on bilateral inter-
nal net debt: Additional claims have to be backed by additional equity to fulfill capital
requirements, hence a higher capital requirement can discourage internal lending.
Tosummarize, bothaggregateandbilateral internaldebt regressionsonGermanmulti-
national banks indicate that banks engage in debt shifting. Moreover, the estimated
effect in the banking sector is larger than previous studies estimated for non-financial
firms, both absolutely and relatively to the sample average of internal debt ratios. This
becomes even clearer when I correct for conduit entities: Since conduit affiliates are
taxed lower than the sample average, using the internal-net-debt ratio as dependent
variable leads to even larger estimated tax responses. Accounting for conduit debt is
also a more general methodological issue that can be addressed by future empirical
internal debt shifting studies on non-banks.
2.6 Conclusion
The immaterial nature of the banking business and the concentrated expertise in
the optimal design of financial transactions suggest that the financial sector uses its
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tax planning possibilities more aggressively than other sectors do. However, there
are only few studies considering tax avoidance in the banking sector. Contributing
to this literature, my essay is the first that investigates internal debt shifting in the
financial sector. I find convincing evidence that banks engage in debt shifting, with a
ten percentage points higher tax rate increasing the internal-net-debt-to-total-assets
ratio by about 5.6 percentage points. At the mean this corresponds to an increase by
20%. Moreover, a comparison of my results to previous studies on non-financial firms
suggests that banks use debt shifting more aggressively.
I furthermore show that it is important to account for conduit entities in internal debt
financing, as with the classical measure for internal debt shifting results are downward
biased. This is not only important in the context of internal debt shifting in the
financial sector, but also for multinationals in general. Anecdotal evidence shows that
also multinational enterprises in other sectors establish affiliates acting as internal
banks (The Guardian, 2014). If these internal banks are mainly located in low-tax
countries, previous studies have underestimated the extent of tax avoidance through
the use of internal debt.
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Chapter 3
Taxing Transmitters of Distress:
Evidence from the German Bank
Levy
3.1 Introduction
In the wake of the financial crisis, governments in the U.S. and Europe have spent
large sums bailing out ailing banks. To ensure that banks bear an adequate share
in the costs of stabilizing the financial industry, several countries have introduced
bank levies (see Figure 3.1 for European countries). Most recently Poland (February
2016) and Australia (July 2017) adopted a bank levy. Almost all of these levies raise
the bulk of their revenues from a tax on some inter-bank liabilities held by affected
banks. This design reflects the main aim of bank levies: They are intended to have a
Pigouvian effect on banks’ potentially risk-transmitting liabilities, thereby improving
the stability of the financial sector and reducing its systemic risks.
Legislators aim at achieving these Pigouvian goals with bank levies through the com-
bination of three effects: First, in several countries, levy revenues contribute to newly
established bank restructuring funds that are used for bail-outs of troubled banks in
the future and should prevent future financial crises. Second, by taxing inter-bank li-
abilities the legislator aims for a reduction of these potential transmitters of distress.
With a reduction in the share of inter-bank debt also the potential impact of a bank’s
default on other banks decreases. And third, the intended reduction in debt also di-
rectly pushes each levy-paying bank to a more solid funding by increasing its equity
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Figure 3.1: Countries with Bank Levies in Europe
European countries with bank levies that were in place by 2011 (blue)
and by 2016 (green), including countries that participate in the European
banking union and have thus introduced the European bank levy in 2015.
ratio.
This essay uses data on German banks to investigate whether bank levies can achieve
these Pigouvian effects and therefore reduce systemic risks in the banking sector. For
the first part of the analysis, I adopt a difference-in-differences estimator. The German
bank levy is well suited for such an approach as it allows for a levy-exempt amount
of e300 million in relevant liabilities (i.e. total liabilities net of equity and deposits).
Beyond this threshold a progressive levy schedule applies. Almost all affected banks
are in the first levy bracket (85.4% of affected banks) and the second levy bracket
(5.0%) during the whole sample period, facing a marginal levy rate of 0.02% and 0.03%,
respectively. For them I find a decrease in relevant liabilities after the introduction of
the German bank levy of about 6% to 9% compared to non-affected banks.
Replacing relevant liabilities by non-affected funding (equity and customer deposits)
might be an option for affected banks to avoid the levy without reducing their busi-
ness volumes. Whereas an increase in equity would reinforce the intended Pigouvian
effect, an increase in customer deposits weakens the positive effect of the reduction in
uninsured inter-bank liabilities by replacing them with liabilities insured in a deposit
insurance system. However, I do not find significant effects of the German bank levy
on neither equity nor customer deposits. Taken together, these results suggest that
the German bank levy indeed led to a reduction in balance sheet volumes and a better
capitalization of affected banks. Estimating explicitly the effect on total assets shows
that affected banks reduced their balance sheet volumes in the first levy bracket by
about 3% and in the second bracket by about 7%.
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The significant reduction in inter-bank liabilities suggests that the German bank levy
succeeded in reducing these potentially distress-transmitting funds. Regarding the
direct effect on an individual bank’s funding risk, I consider equity-to-total-assets ra-
tios and z-scores using the same difference-in-differences setting and confirm these
findings. Equity ratios of affected banks in the first levy bracket significantly increase
by about 0.2 percentage points compared to non-affected banks, corresponding to an
increase by 3% to 4% at the pre-treatment mean of affected banks. The significant
increase in z-scores of banks in the first levy bracket corroborates these findings, indi-
cating a decrease in their probability of insolvency.
Apart from substitution by non-affected funds, another potential way to circumvent
the German bank levy is only open to multinational banks: Foreign subsidiaries of
German banks are not subject to the German bank levy. By shifting inter-bank liabil-
ities (and the related activities) to these subsidiaries, banks can avoid levy payments
without actually reducing their business volumes. Comparing foreign subsidiaries
of German banks in countries without bank levies with matched non-German banks
yields indeed an increase in relevant liabilities by about 19%. To assess the impact
of this shifting on the overall reduction in inter-bank liabilities, I furthermore con-
solidate foreign subsidiaries into German core banks. I then find that multinational
banks that have subsidiaries in countries without bank levies did not significantly re-
duce their overall relevant liabilities. By contrast, the estimated effect on banks that
have no shifting possibility slightly intensifies when controlling for potential multina-
tional shifters.
This essay contributes to the recent literature on the impact of bank levies on banks’
behavior. Several papers study the incidence of bank levies: Buch et al. (2016) empir-
ically examine the short term effects of the German bank levy and find that affected
banks reduce lending to customers and pay higher deposit rates. Haskamp (2018) finds
that German savings and cooperative banks also increased lending rates in response to
the introduction of the bank levy, with spill-overs to banks not directly affected by the
levy. Kogler (2016) models and empirically confirms these findings using bank-level
evidence for 23 EU countries. Also Capelle-Blancard and Havrylchyk (2017) investi-
gate the incidence of bank levies and find with data on the Hungarian bank levy that
banks shift the burden partly to customers. Considering potential changes in the risk-
iness of banks due to the introduction of bank levies, a recent theoretical contribution
by Diemer (2017) models different types of bank levies and finds that bank levies in-
deed can reduce banks’ risk. Most closely related to my essay is the work by Devereux
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et al. (2017) who study bank levies in several European countries using a multinational
bank dataset. They show that equity-to-assets ratios in affected banks increased, but
at the same time the average risk weight of assets also rose. This essay contributes to
this literature by showing that bank levies indeed succeed in reducing banks’ poten-
tially risk-transmitting liabilities and their probabilities of insolvency, but banks also
make use of possibilities to circumvent the levy.
Apart from direct taxes on banks’ liabilities there is a substantial literature on the effect
of corporate profit taxes on banks’ use of debt. Several studies find that banks’ lever-
ages increase with corporate tax rates, reflecting the tax advantage of debt compared
to equity (Gu et al., 2015; Schepens, 2016; Milonas, 2016). Reiter (2017) considers in-
ternal debt and shows that banks use intra-group lending to avoid corporate taxes by
shifting profits to lower taxed affiliates. Merz and Overesch (2016) find broader ev-
idence for profit shifting in response to corporate taxation. Langenmayr and Reiter
(2017) show that particularly proprietary trading of banks is responsive to taxes.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 outlines the institu-
tional details and motives for the German bank levy. Section 3.3 explains the database.
In Section 3.4 I develop the empirical strategy, which I apply to the data in Section 3.5.
Section 3.6 considers fund shifting to foreign subsidiaries. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 The German Bank Levy
The German legislator designed the national bank levy as a tax on two components
of banks’ balance sheets: The first is a flat tax of 0.0003% on derivatives, both on
the liability and the asset side. However, in terms of generated levy revenues this
derivatives part is of minor importance. The bulk of revenues is generated by the
second component that levies a progressive tax on total liabilities net of equity and
customer deposits (as the latter are already insured in a deposit insurance system).
The resulting tax base predominantly consists of securitized liabilities and liabilities
to other banks and hence of funds that transmit distress in the banking sector: If
one bank fails, it cannot pay back these inter-bank liabilities, potentially causing
solvency problems also in creditor banks. The legislative proposal for the German
bank levy explicitly identified these liabilities as reflecting a bank’s systemic risk and its
inter-connectedness, having transmitted distress during the financial crisis (Deutscher
Bundestag, 2011).
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As a first contribution, this essay investigates whether the German bank levy really
achieved these intended Pigouvian effects on banks’ use of inter-bank liabilities by
exploiting the features of the levy schedule. Figure 3.2 shows the progressive levy
schedule for the liability component. 77.1% of all German banks are not directly
affected by the bank levy as there is a levy-exempt amount of e300 million. 85.4% of
the banks that are not exempt from the second component are in the first levy bracket,
having relevant liabilities of up toe10 billion and facing a marginal levy rate of 0.02%.
Very large banks pay higher marginal levy rates, with a maximum of 0.06%. However,
the legislator implemented a ceiling that caps total levy payments at 20% of a bank’s
after-tax profit. As a minimum, a bank has to pay 5% of the uncapped levy. The
capped amount is carried forward up to two years.1 The first levy payments were due
in the fall of 2011. The relevant balance sheet for the calculation of bank levy payments
is the final annual balance sheet of the previous year.
Figure 3.2: German Bank Levy Schedule
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The setting of the German bank levy is well suited for investigating banks’ funding
responses to bank levies. In March 2010 the German government announced the in-
troduction of a bank levy. After some controversial discussions, the parliament passed
the law in December 2010 with the German bank levy act entering into force on Jan-
uary 1st, 2011. Whereas the tax base was basically already known by July 2010, banks
did not know the exact levy rates until they were set in a separate regulation in July
2011. As a governing party initially brought a tax rate of 0.1% into the discussion,
banks might have expected much higher rates than those that were eventually intro-
1The German bank levy law actually requires a bank to pay the capped amount up to five
years after the levy originally was due. In a transition period till 2019 this limitation period is
shortened to two years. As the German bank levy was replaced by the European levy in 2015, the
five year limitation period actually never became effective.
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duced (Bo¨rsen-Zeitung, 2010). This could potentially explain the relatively strong
responses in the tax base I find for affected banks.
In the discussion preceding the introduction of the bank levy in Germany some con-
cerns arose that multinational banks can partially circumvent the levy by relocating
relevant liabilities to foreign subsidiaries.2 As only banks holding a German banking
license have to pay the levy, their foreign subsidiaries are not affected (whereas for-
eign branches usually are subject to the levy). As a further contribution, this essay
investigates in Section 3.6 whether banks indeed engaged in such fund shifting.
Figure 3.3: Revenues from the German Bank Levy
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lization Agency (available on www.fmsa.de/en/press) and FAZ
(2014).
Levy revenues feed the newly introduced bank restructuring fund that was thought to
prevent future financial crises (having a target value of e70 billion). Figure 3.3 shows
actual revenues generated by the German bank levy in the years when it was in place.
Withe520 million toe690 million per year, revenues remained far below expectations
of the legislator who initially planned to take aboute1.2 billion each year (FAZ, 2014).
The main reason for this shortfall in levy revenues is that the government’s calculations
were based on pre-crisis balance sheets of banks (as of 2006). Moreover, particularly
for the large commercial banks the levy cap was binding due to lower profits. But also
the strategic responses of affected banks investigated in this essay contributed to the
shortfall in levy revenues.
2Both media (n-tv, 2010) and the German parliament (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010, Drucksache
17/2627, p.9) discussed these loopholes for multinational banks.
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Note that this study does not consider the European bank levy which has replaced
the German national levy in 2015. German bank levy revenues accumulated by then
(e2.3 billion) will remain in the German national restructuring fund which will exist
in parallel with the newly introduced European Single Resolution Fund. However, the
results of this chapter are also valuable for the assessment of the new European bank
levy: The individual levy payment to the European Single Resolution Fund is still an
increasing function of a bank’s total liabilities excluding equity and covered deposits,
although the calculation of individual banks’ contributions is now more complex.
3.3 Data
The original data on individual levy payments from the Financial Markets Stabiliza-
tion Agency (FMSA), which collects the levy, are not available for research. Never-
theless, the German central bank collects comprehensive and high quality data on all
banks’ balance sheet statistics that are accessible to external researchers (Deutsche
Bundesbank, 2017b). This dataset contains all key balance sheet variables needed to
calculate a banks’ tax base for the liability component of the levy according to the
following scheme:
Levy base = Total Liabilities
– Equity
– Customer deposits
– Profit participation capital
– Fund for general banking risk
However, there is some minor imprecision in the calculation of levy bases from Ger-
man central bank data: Profit participation capital with less than two years term to
maturity is not subtracted from the levy base, but I cannot observe maturity in the
data. Therefore I subtract the total amount of profit participation capital from the
levy base. As its share in banks’ balance sheets is negligible,3 this imprecision should
not severely affect the results. Moreover, liabilities to non-bank customers that are
related parties are subject to the levy, but as I cannot distinguish related and unre-
lated customers, I also subtract them from the levy base here.4 The threat of not
3Profit participation capital is on average 0.15% of total assets in the sample period, the share
having less than two years term to maturity is therefore even lower (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2017a).
4Note that there is no problem if the related party is also a bank, because liabilities then
correctly remain in the levy base.
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subtracting liabilities to related non-banks is that banks that are subject to the levy
(because liabilities to related non-banks place them above the exemption threshold)
are incorrectly classified as non-treated. However, as these treated banks then would
incorrectly be in the control group, this should work against the proposed effect.5
This essay uses monthly data around the introduction of the German bank levy in
January 2011, covering a four year period from September 2009 to August 2013. To
avoiddiscrete jumps in thedata, I excludebanks that conductedamergeroracquisition
in the sample period or that were not observed in all months. Moreover, I remove banks
that are classified as banks with special functions (mostly development banks) from
the sample as they are exempt from paying bank levies. Table 3.1 shows baseline
descriptive statistics for the variables and the sample used in the next section. Note
that data needed for the calculation of the z-score are only available at annual frequency
(2009-2013), resulting in a lower number of observations.
Table 3.1: Baseline Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Median
Levy base (in e1,000) 61,776 637,825 3,339,968 77,203
Equity (in e1,000) 61,776 80,851 239,881 21,387
Deposits (in e1,000) 61,776 1,003,126 2,781,268 258,861
Total assets (in e1,000) 61,776 1,734,522 5,884,111 375,609
Return on assets (in %) 59,708 0.045 3.322 0.168
Equity/TA (in %) 61,654 6.503 6.489 5.608
Z-score 6,200 24.477 151.071 10.517
Sample period from 09/2009 to 08/2013. All variables at monthly frequency, ex-
cept the z-score, which is at annual frequency. Data from the banks’ balance sheet
statistics of Deutsche Bundesbank (2017b). Data on banks’ profits is matched
from the profits and loss statements component of the Bundesbank database for
the calculation of the return on assets; as for some banks information on profits
is missing and/or total assets are zero, the number of observations for return on
assets is lower. For variable definitions see Appendix C.1.
5For some liabilities (development loans towards banks and trust liabilities from development
loans business) a reduced levy rate applies. I cannot distinguish between liabilities affected by
regular bank levy rates and by reduced rates. However, the volume of liabilities affected by reduced
rates should be rather small. Germany’s second largest bank, DZ Bank, for instance reports a
business volume in development loans equal to about 3% of total liabilities in 2014 (DZ Bank,
2016). Also reduced levy rates set the same qualitative incentive to reduce these liabilities, but
the absolute response is probably smaller. Treating these reduced-rate liabilities as if they were
taxed at the regular rates leads, if influencing results at all, to an underestimation of the regular
bank levy effect.
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3.4 Empirical Strategy
In the following, the essay investigates how banks responded to the introduction of
the German bank levy. The design of the levy is well suited to employ a systematic
difference-in-differences estimator, as there is a control group of non-affected banks
below the levy exemption threshold of e300 million. Comparing banks below and
above a threshold is analogous to the method used by Kleven et al. (2014) for evaluating
preferential tax schemes for top-income earners. In the context of bank levies it was
also applied by e.g. Buch et al. (2016) and Capelle-Blancard and Havrylchyk (2017).
3.4.1 Baseline Difference-in-Differences Estimator
In my setting the first treatment group are banks in the first levy bracket, facing a
marginal levy rate of 0.02%. The second treatment group are all German banks in the
second levy bracket (marginal levy rate of 0.03%). As control group for both treatment
groups I use banks below the levy exemption threshold, having relevant liabilities up
to e300 million (the exemption threshold) and being unaffected by the German bank
levy. Table 3.2 shows descriptive statistics for these treatment and control groups.
Most banks are in the control group of levy-exempt banks. Of those being not exempt,
the majority is located in the first levy bracket. To be in one of the treatment and
control groups, a bank has to be in the respective group during the whole sample
period. This means that I delete 25 levy bracket switchers from my sample, as they
are potential bunchers. If influencing results at all, deleting switchers might lead to an
underestimation of the levy’s effect. In a robustness check, I combine all banks above
the levy exemption threshold to one single treatment group. This treatment group
then also includes banks that switch between different levy brackets (but not between
being exempt and paying the levy at all) and banks that are in higher levy brackets.
To systematically investigate the bank levy’s treatment effect, I estimate the following
difference-in-differences model:
ln(Levybaseit) = β1 Treated1i · Postt (3.1)
+ β2 Treated2i · Postt + γi + δt + it
where i indicates banks and t is an index for year-month. The dependent variable is
the natural logarithm of the tax base for the bank levy. Treated1i and Treated2i are
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Table 3.2: Treatment and Control Groups
Variable Control Alternative 1st levy 2nd levy All levy-
group control group bracket bracket affected
Relevant liabilities (billion e) 0-0.3 0.15-0.3 0.3-10 10-100 ≥ 0.3
Number of banks 1,014 41 258 15 302
Mean levy base (1,000 e)
in 12/2009 73,497 221,340 1,342,433 29,600,000 6,782,707
in 12/2011 72,761 222,133 1,298,038 28,500,000 7,180,355
Equity/TA (%)
in 12/2009 6.800 5.431 5.000 3.278 4.836
in 12/2011 6.779 5.470 5.276 3.421 5.102
The table shows descriptive statistics of banks in the control and treatment groups. The control group are all
banks that have relevant liabilities below the levy exemption threshold of e0.3 billion during the full sample
period (09/2009-08/2013). The alternative control group is a subsample of banks that are closer to this
threshold (with relevant liabilities between e0.15 billion and e0.3 billion). Treatment groups are banks that
are in the 1st levy bracket and banks in the 2nd levy bracket during the full sample period; in a robustness
check I combine all banks above the exemption threshold to one single treatment group (all levy-affected).
Source: banks’ balance sheet statistics of Deutsche Bundesbank (2017b).
dummies equal to one if bank i is in the first or the second levy bracket, respectively.
Postt is a dummy indicating the treatment period, being equal to one for January 2011
and all following months. The difference-in-differences methodology is very appealing
in the context of this essay as it allows to control for several unobserved factors: γi are
bank dummies, absorbing all time constant individual bank characteristics. All macro-
economic, regulatory and legislative shocks equally affecting all banks in a period
are eliminated by including δt, capturing monthly time fixed effects. The remaining
variation used for identification are therefore differences in levy base changes across
German banks. it is the error term. The sample for estimation of equation (3.1)
consists of all banks being either levy-exempt or in the first or second levy bracket.
An obvious concern with this commonly applied approach is that treated and control
banks systematically differ in size. However, as the next section shows, the assumption
of parallel trends in the pre-treatment period is met in this setting. Moreover, as a
robustness check, I restrict the control group in the analysis to banks having relevant
liabilities between e150 million and e300 million. On the other side of the threshold,
the relatively small banks in the first levy bracket are the treated banks that are most
comparable to the control group. This is reflected by the pre-treatment trends in
balance sheet items: as shown in Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2, trends for banks in the first
levy bracket fit better to the control group than trends for banks in the second bracket.
The comparability to the control group is also one reason why this study does not
investigate higher levy brackets in more detail. What adds to this is that there are
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only four banks in total in these higher brackets, and showing figures resulting from
data on less than three banks or being dominated by two banks violates Deutsche
Bundesbank’s confidentiality restrictions. As mentioned above, I conduct a robustness
check by combining all levy brackets to a single treatment group.
3.4.2 Estimator for Alternative Funds
The direct effect of raising the costs for inter-bank liabilities and thereby reducing this
tax base is probably not the only impact of a bank levy on a bank’s funding decision.
The reduction in debt may have several further effects: On the one hand, assuming
that marginal revenues are a positive but declining function of invested assets, the
reduction in funds (and related assets) leads to an increase in the marginal return
of additional assets. On the other hand, the reduction in bank debt also means an
improvement in a bank’s capitalization rate (an increase in the equity-to-assets ratio),
whichtheoretically translates into lower fundingcosts forcustomerdepositsandequity.
With a higher marginal return and lower marginal costs, a bank might increase both
customer deposits and equity.
While the bank levy imposes an incentive to substitute inter-bank liabilities by equity
and deposits, there are further aspects of the financing decision that make a switch to
equity or deposits potentially unattractive. First, raising equity is more expensive than
debt financing, as equity is subordinate to other liabilities. Shareholders thus demand
higher risk premiums (see e.g. McGrattan and Prescott, 2003). Moreover, the cost
of equity is not deductible from the corporate tax base whereas interest expenses for
debt usually are, generating a tax advantage of debt as shown by Modigliani and Miller
(1963). From a practical perspective, a switch is relatively difficult to implement, at
least in the short term: An increase in equity by additional capital or retained earnings
is not a plain management decision but usually requires approval by shareholders.
Substituting inter-bank liabilities with retained earnings also conflicts with the finding
of Brav et al. (2005) that it is a major objective of managers to maintain past dividend
levels. Also a substitution by additional customer deposits is difficult in practice:
Banks compulsorily have to insure customer deposits via the legal deposit insurance.
On the one hand this reduces risk premiums banks have to pay to customers, but on
the other hand banks have to pay a fixed insurance premium per euro of customer
deposits, increasing costs of deposit financing again (for a discussion see Greenbaum
and Thakor, 1987). Moreover, both customer deposits and equity are considerably less
flexible, which increases potential costs of adjustment to changing market conditions.
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Overall, it is therefore unclear how attractive it is for banks to substitute lower inter-
bank liabilities.
To investigate whether levy-affected banks actually have substituted inter-bank li-
abilities by non-affected funds, in Section 3.5.2 I apply the difference-in-differences
estimator outlined in equation (3.1) to equity and customer deposits.
3.4.3 Estimator for Risk Measures
Regarding a bank’s funding risk, a substitution of inter-bank liabilities by equity would
clearly strengthenabank’s capitalization rateandreinforce thePigouvianeffects found
in Section 3.5.1. If inter-bank liabilities are instead substituted by customer deposits,
the risk on the liability side of the balance sheet also decreases as customer deposits are
insured in the legal deposit insurance scheme. Moreover, the positive effect on systemic
risks in the banking sector remains as inter-connectedness of banks is reduced.
InSection3.5.3 Ifinallyapply the estimator in equation (3.1) to twocommon individual
risk measures in the banking sector. The first captures a bank’s funding risk by dividing
equity by total assets. Second, I analyze the effect on the z-score, a measure for the
probability of insolvency going back to Roy (1952), which is widely used in the banking
literature (e.g. Laeven and Levine, 2009; Gropp et al., 2014; Schepens, 2016). It is
calculated as the sum of the capital-to-assets ratio6 and the return on assets, divided
by the standard deviation of the return on assets.7 Basically it measures the distance
to insolvency by considering the volatility of a bank’s profits and the capital that can
absorb potential losses. The higher the z-score the lower is the insolvency risk.8
6Capital in the calculation of the z-score comprises equity and the bank’s fund for general
banking risk.
7See Lepetit and Strobel (2013) for a discussion of the z-score calculation in panel settings.
8It would also be interesting to study whether German banks adjusted their portfolio risk on
the assets side of the balance sheet in response to the bank levy. Diemer (2017) models different
types of bank levies and finds that a levy on liabilities can induce banks to behave more prudently.
However, Devereux et al. (2017) find that European national bank levies have increased the average
risk weight of assets and thus the portfolio risk (while decreasing the funding risk). Unfortunately,
the Bundesbank database on German banks used here does not provide any information on a
bank’s assets risk; hence I cannot investigate how affected German banks adjusted their portfolio
risk.
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3.4.4 Threats to Identification
Bunching responses of banks could be a potential threat to identification: As there are
kinks in the levy schedule, banks located in the range closely above the thresholds in
the levy schedule could have strategically reduced their relevant liabilities. Figure 3.4
investigates this issue by examining the distribution of German banks over the levy
base, both before and after the introduction of the German bank levy. It illustrates that
the distribution remains relatively unchanged after the introduction of the bank levy.
Most importantly, there is no excess mass below and no missing mass above the levy
exemption threshold. Applying the bunching estimator for difference-in-differences
settings developed by Kleven et al. (2014) confirms that there is no discontinuity at
the levy exemption threshold. As there are only few banks per bin in higher ranges of
the levy base, confidentiality requirements of the German central bank do not allow to
show the distribution over the full range. However, applying the bunching estimator
to the second kink in the levy schedule also does not show bunching evidence. For
the range above e200 billion (the third kink in the levy schedule) there are only four
banks, which makes a similar bunching analysis infeasible.
Figure 3.4: Distribution of Banks over the Levy base
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Distribution of German banks over the tax base for the German bank
levy. The bin size is e30 million. The red line indicates the first kink
in the levy schedule at which the marginal levy rate increases from
0.00% to 0.02%. Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, banks’ monthly
balance sheet statistics.
Another potential threat to identification of the bank levy’s effect with the difference-
in-differences settings outlined above are other regulatory measures in the sample
period that affect banks above and below the levy exemption threshold differently.
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The European supervisory stress tests in 2010 and 2011 come to mind.9 Of the 14
banks tested in Germany (in 2010, 12 banks in 2011), most are in the third or higher
levy brackets which are not the main treatment group investigated here. Roughly
calculating their levy bases using their publicly available 2010 annual reports10 shows
that only one screened bank is in the first levy bracket (Landesbank Berlin) and that
this bank had a core capital ratio far beyond regulatory requirements, therefore not
being seriously affected by the stress tests. In the second levy bracket, two of the fifteen
banks are screened in the European stress tests in the sample period. As the bulk of
stress tested banks is in higher levy brackets, potential banks’ responses to stress tests
should not severely influence my results, particularly not in the preferred treatment
group of banks in the first levy bracket.
A further potential regulatory issue is the implementation of the Basel II.5 adjustments
to capital requirements for trading positions and resecuritisations. In Germany this
regulation entered into force in January 2012, one year after the introduction of the
bank levy. Broader changes in capital requirements were announced in December
2010 with Basel III, but first measures were only implemented in 2013. Hence all these
regulationsonlymatterhere if banksanticipated theadjustmentsyears inadvance, and
only if they affected treated and control banks differently. However, it is not obvious
why this should be the case - particularly when comparing banks in the first levy
bracket to the alternative control group of banks having relevant liabilities between
e150 million and the exemption threshold of e300 million. As these banks have very
similar equity ratios (see Table 3.2), it is plausible that they were also exposed to the
announcements of enhanced capital requirements in a similar way.
3.5 Funding Responses of Affected Banks
This section applies the estimation procedure described in Section 3.4 on banks’ bal-
ance sheet data: First, I investigate whether banks respond with a reduction of the tax
base. Afterwards, I consider whether banks substituted affected inter-bank liabilities
with non-affected funds, namely equity and customer deposits.
9See Petrella and Resti (2013) for a discussion of the European bank stress tests.
10The banks’ balance sheet statistics database of the Deutsche Bundesbank (2017b) is
anonymized and does not provide bank names. For assessing the levy bracket of a particular
bank I therefore have to rely on individual banks’ publicly available balance sheets.
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3.5.1 Direct Effect on the Levy Base
As a direct effect on the tax base, I expect that banks subject to the levy re-
duce their relevant liabilities, which should lead to more solidly financed banks, less
inter-connectedness and hence a more stable financial sector. For the difference-in-
differences estimator outlined in the previous section it is important that there is a
common trend in the outcome during the pre-treatment period. The left panel of Fig-
ure 3.5 graphically compares the time trend in relevant liabilities of banks in the first
levy bracket to the control group, the right panel analogously compares banks in the
second levy bracket to the same control group. Particularly in the first levy bracket
pre-treatment trends fit well to the control group, such that the common trends as-
sumption is fulfilled. In the second levy bracket the time trend in relevant liabilities
is also similar to the control group, even though the fit is not as good as for banks in
the first treatment group. The obvious reason for this is that banks in the first levy
bracket and in the control group are more similar in size and business models whereas
banks in the second levy bracket are substantially larger than control banks. Another
reason is that there are only 15 banks in the second levy bracket, which makes the time
series more volatile.
Figure 3.5 also indicates first descriptive evidence for the intended Pigouvian effect of
the bank levy. Relevant liabilities in both the first and the second levy bracket decrease
after the introduction of the bank levy compared to the control group of non-affected
banks. After a few months the time series then went back on a parallel trend again,
with the gap between the control group and the treatment groups remaining quite
stable.
Table 3.3 presents the results of applying the systematic difference-in-differences es-
timator outlined in Section 3.4.1 to the data. Consistent with Figure 3.5 the baseline
results in column (1) show a significantly negative treatment effect in the first and
the second levy bracket, with coefficients of -0.090 and -0.073. This corresponds to a
reduction in relevant liabilities by about 8.6% in the first levy bracket and by about
7.0% in the second levy bracket.11 This means that the estimated semi-elasticity is
not larger in the second levy bracket despite the higher marginal levy rate. However
note that the absolute response is much higher, as the share of relevant liabilities in
banks’ total assets is considerably larger in the second levy bracket (60% in 12/2010)
11As demonstrated by Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980), the percentage change in specifications
with an explanatory dummy variable and a logarithmic dependent variable can be calculated from
the estimated coefficient c according to (exp(c)− 1) ∗ 100.
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Figure 3.5: Effect of the Bank Levy on Banks’ Relevant Liabilities
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Time trends in banks’ relevant liabilities. The left figure compares banks in the first levy bracket (facing
a marginal levy rate of 0.02%) to the control group of banks that are exempt from the bank levy. The
right figure compares banks in the second levy bracket (facing a marginal levy rate of 0.03%) to the
same control group. Series are normalized by the pre-treatment mean. The vertical line indicates the
introduction of the German bank levy in January 2011. Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, banks’ monthly
balance sheet statistics.
than in the first bracket (34%).
Column (2) accounts for the fact that levy payments are capped at 20% of a bank’s
after-tax profit by excluding all observations from banks that are subject to the cap in
the respective year. The cap particularly affects large banks, as in the first levy bracket
only 8.9% to 11.6% (depending on the year in the sample period) of banks are capped,
whereas 80% of banks in the second levy bracket are. For capped banks, incentives to
reduce liabilities are lower. Nevertheless, I find virtually unchanged coefficients. The
reason for the only small change is probably that banks cannot perfectly foresee their
annual profit and whether the cap will be binding at the end of the year. An additional
explanation is that the capped amount is carried forward up to two years. Note that
the insignificance of the treatment effect in the second levy bracket might be due to
the fact that there are now only three uncapped banks left, which might be insufficient
for the identification of a significant effect.
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Table 3.3: Baseline Regressions
Dependent variable:
ln(Levybase)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated1 · Post -0.090∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.020)
Treated2 · Post -0.073∗∗ -0.074 -0.067∗ -0.033
(0.037) (0.056) (0.037) (0.040)
Treated · Post -0.077∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.020)
ROAt−1 3.030∗∗∗ 0.024 3.063∗∗∗ 7.283***
(0.715) (4.924) (0.714) (1.848)
Bank FE & monthly time FE X X X X X X X X
Control group 0-300m 0-300m 0-300m 150m-
300m
0-300m 0-300m 0-300m 150m-
300m
Only uncapped X X
Observations 61,776 59,764 59,708 14,068 63,168 60,528 60,764 15,124
R2 0.988 0.989 0.990 0.988 0.989 0.989 0.991 0.990
Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of relevant liabilities for the German bank levy. Post is a dummy equal to one for all months after 12/2010
(indicating the treatment period). Treated1 is a dummy for banks in the first levy bracket (facing a marginal levy rate of 0.02%) and Treated2 is a dummy
for banks in the second levy bracket (marginal levy rate of 0.03%). Treated is a dummy that combines all levy brackets to a single treatment group, being
equal to one if a bank has liabilities above the levy exemption threshold of e300 million. The control group are all banks below the threshold, except in
columns (4) and (8) where the control group are banks with relevant liabilities between e150 million and e300 million. ROAt−1 is the annual lagged return
on assets. In columns (2) and (6) all banks affected by the levy cap at 20% of after-tax profits are excluded. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank
level in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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In another robustness check in column (3), I control for a bank’s profitability by in-
cluding the return on assets in the previous year (ROAt−1, defined as after-tax profit
divided by total assets) as explanatory variable. The estimated treatment effects are
very similar to the baseline specification in column (1). The positive effect ofROAt−1
may reflect that more profitable banks are also more creditworthy, resulting in more
borrowing. Column (4) provides a final robustness check by restricting the control
group to banks with relevant liabilities between e150 million (corresponding to 50%
of the exemption threshold) and the exemption threshold. I continue to find negative
coefficients for the treatment indicators, although the effect is insignificant for the 15
banks in the second levy bracket.
In columns (5) to (8) I re-estimate these specifications without distinguishing between
the different levy brackets. Here a bank is considered as treated simply if it is above
the exemption threshold. Hence this treatment group now also includes banks in levy
brackets above e100 billion and 25 banks that switch between different levy brackets
during the sample period and were therefore dropped from the sample in columns (1)
to (4). The estimated effects of the bank levy are very similar to the results in the
previous specifications.
Taken together, I find strong evidence for a Pigouvian effect of the bank levy on the
vast majority of banks in the first levy bracket. I also find a negative effect for banks
in the second levy bracket, however there are only 15 banks in this second treatment
group and the evidence is weaker.
3.5.2 Substitution by Equity and Deposits
As the previous section has shown, the German bank levy reduced banks’ relevant lia-
bilities. However, for a further evaluation of the intended Pigouvian effect we have to
investigate whether banks indeed reduced their business volume or whether they sub-
stituted affected liabilities by other non-affected funding options. The two potential
balance sheet items to substitute with are customer deposits and equity.
To investigate the potential substitution in funding, this section applies the difference-
in-differences estimator employed in the previous section to customer deposits and
equity. To confirm the resulting change of banks’ business volumes, I also investigate
the effect on total assets. Figure 3.6a shows graphical evidence for customer deposits
and Figure 3.6b for equity. For both balance sheet items, I find a generally positive
trend, in the treatment and the control groups. Moreover, in all parts of Figure
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3.6 there is a parallel trend in treatment and control groups, as is required for the
difference-in-differences estimator to be valid. However, there is no obvious treatment
effect in customer deposits and equity after the introduction of the German bank levy
in January 2011, indicating that there was no systematic substitution of inter-bank
liabilities by equity and deposits.12
Figure 3.6: Trends in Banks’ Non-Affected Liabilities
a: Effect of the bank levy on customer deposits
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b: Effect of the bank levy on equity
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Time trends in banks’ customer deposits (Panel A) and equity (Panel B). The left figure compares
banks in the first levy bracket (facing a marginal levy rate of 0.02%) to the control group of banks that
are exempt from the bank levy. The right figure compares banks in the second levy bracket (facing a
marginal levy rate of 0.03%) to the same control group. Series are normalized by the pre-treatment
mean. The vertical line indicates the introduction of the German bank levy in January 2011. Source:
Deutsche Bundesbank, banks’ monthly balance sheet statistics.
12The time series on equity in Figure 3.6b shows that banks periodically increase equity in the
mid of the year, when banks have held their annual general meetings and shareholders have decided
about capital increases. However, the 15 banks in the second levy bracket strikingly deviate from
this pattern in mid 2012 – as 80% of them are subject to the levy cap due to low profits in the
after-treatment period, these banks probably also had not enough profits to increase their capital
through retained earnings.
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Table 3.4 shows regression results. For both customer deposits and equity, I do not
find significantly positive effects as we would expect if banks switch to these unaffected
liabilities. Estimated coefficients for the interaction term between the Post dummy
and the treatment dummies for the first and the second levy bracket are statistically
insignificant in all specifications. These results on potential substitution funds there-
fore suggest that banks did not systematically elude bank levy payments by replacing
inter-bank liabilities with deposits or equity. This also means that there is no addi-
tional strengthening of banks’ equity bases that would have reinforced the intended
Pigouvian effect of the bank levy found in the previous section.
As both customer deposits and equity are relatively inflexible, banks might not respond
with a discrete increase in these balance sheet items, but change their strategy of
generating funds. Such a strategy change towards equity and deposits would translate
into an increase in the growth rates of these funds, but does not immediately lead to
a significant increase in their levels. To test this issue, in Appendix C.2 I apply the
difference-in-differences estimatoralso togrowth rates of customerdeposits andequity.
Again I do not find evidence for a switch to alternative funds, with most treatment
indicators being insignificant. I only find a weakly significant negative effect on equity
growth of banks in the second levy bracket. As a negative effect is clearly not in line
with a strategy change towards equity funding, it may reflect that these banks had
relatively low profits that were available for increasing equity – 80% of banks in the
second levy bracket are affected by the levy cap due to low profits.
Together with the results from the previous section, these findings suggest that levy-
affected banks respond by a decrease in their business volume. To test this explicitly,
I apply the difference-in-differences estimator to the natural logarithm of banks’ total
assets. Results in columns (7) to (9) of Table 3.4 confirm that banks in the first levy
bracket reduced their relevant liabilities by 2.7% to 3.4% compared to the control group
of non-affected banks, whereas banks in the second bracket reduced their liabilities by
6.7% to 7.8%. The absolute and relative differences of these effects compared to the
percentages changes estimated for the levy base in Table 3.3 reflect the different shares
of relevant liabilities in total assets: The larger banks in the second levy bracket are
financed considerably more by inter-bank liabilities than the smaller banks in the first
levy bracket.
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Table 3.4: Regressions on Customer Deposits, Equity and Total Assets
Dep. var.: Dep. var.: Dep. var.:
ln(Customer deposits) ln(Equity) ln(Total assets)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Treated1 · Post -0.004 -0.012 -0.014 -0.012 -0.009 0.008 -0.033∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
Treated2 · Post -0.019 -0.012 -0.014 0.002 0.003 0.022 -0.081∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
ROAt−1 1.570 -5.455 -0.225 4.834 0.803∗∗ -0.887
(1.180) (10.401) (0.215) (4.386) (0.392) (5.617)
Bank FE & monthly time FE X X X X X X X X X
Control group 0-300m 0-300m 150m- 0-300m 0-300m 150m- 0-300m 0-300m 150m-
300m 300m 300m
Observations 61,341 59,561 14,020 61,004 59,704 14,064 61,776 59,708 14,068
R2 0.988 0.994 0.992 0.997 0.998 0.996 0.997 0.998 0.996
Dependent variables are the natural logarithms of customer deposits in columns (1) to (3), of equity in columns (4) to (6) and of total assets in columns (7)
to (9). Post is a dummy equal to one for all months after 12/2010 (indicating the treatment period). Treated1 is a dummy for banks in the first levy bracket
(facing a marginal levy rate of 0.02%) and Treated2 is a dummy for banks in the second levy bracket (marginal levy rate of 0.03%). The control group are all
banks below the levy exemption threshold of e300 million, except in columns (3), (6) and (9) where the control group are banks with relevant liabilities between
e150 million and e300 million. ROAt−1 is the lagged return on assets. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level in parentheses. *** and ** indicate
significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
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As a robustness test, Appendix C.3 shows results for these regressions on alternative
funds and total assets with combining all banks above the exemption threshold to one
single treatment group. Similarly, there is no significant treatment effect on customer
deposits andequity inall butone specification. Incolumn(2), Ifindaweakly significant
coefficient, however as it is negative it also does not suggest a substitution of levy-
affected funds by equity. The effects on total assets confirm previous findings of a
decrease by about 3.1% to 4.2%.
3.5.3 Effect on Risk Measures
As shown in the previous sections, German banks indeed decreased the tax base in re-
sponse to the introduction of the bank levy in 2011. As there is no effect on customer
deposits and equity, the decline in inter-bank liabilities should translate into more
solidly financed banks and a positive effect on bank risk measures. This section inves-
tigates the effect of the German bank levy on two risk measures: the equity-to-assets
ratio and the z-score.
Table 3.5 shows regression results of the difference-in-differences setting. As directly
implied by the previous results, I find positive effects on equity-to-total-assets ratios
of banks in the first levy bracket in columns (1) and (2). Estimates indicate that the
bank levy increased the equity-to-total-assets ratios by about 0.16 to 0.2 percentage
points. At the pre-treatment mean of banks in the first levy bracket (5.0%) this
corresponds to an increase by 3% to 4%. In line with these results, I find that z-scores
of banks in the first levy bracket have increased after the introduction of the German
bank levy by 2.948 compared to the control group of non-affected banks. Note that
I can only use annual data for the z-score regressions, as the required information on
profits is only available on a yearly basis. When restricting the control group to banks
with relevant liabilities between e150 million and e300 million, a similar positive
coefficient arises. This means that after the introduction of the German bank levy the
probability of insolvency of affected banks in the first levy bracket indeed has declined.
As Hannan and Hanweck (1988) and Boyd et al. (1993) point out, the z-score measure
Z allows to calculate an upper bound for the probability of insolvency p according to
p ≤ Z−2. Applying this formula to the z-score in December 2009 implies an average
pre-treatment mean of the insolvency probability in the first levy bracket of 0.089%.
The estimated effects in columns (3) and (4) imply a reduction at the mean to 0.076%,
i.e. roughly a 15% decrease.
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However, for banks in the second levy bracket I find no significant evidence for positive
effects on banks’ risk, neither with the equity-to-total-assets ratios nor with the z-
scores. Reasons for this may again be the small number of banks in the second levy
bracket and that banks in the second levy bracket are substantially larger than banks
in the control group. If I combine all treatment groups to one single treatment group
I find very similar results for the bank levy effects on equity ratios in columns (3)
and (4). I also continue to find positive effects on banks’ z-scores in columns (7) and
(8), however, they are now considerably larger than for the first treatment group and
insignificant. This hints to a large volatility of profits in the very large banks that
influences results here.
Table 3.5: Regressions on Risk Measures
Dep. var.: Dep. var.:
Equity/TA (%) Z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated1 · Post 0.205** 0.161** 2.948** 2.857**
(0.105) (0.070) (1.414) (1.416)
Treated2 · Post 0.117 0.072 0.127 0.035
(0.127) (0.101) (60.998) (61.177)
Treated · Post 0.186∗ 0.146∗∗ 5.559 5.467
(0.104) (0.069) (3.793) (3.802)
Bank FE & time FE X X X X X X X X
Control group 0-
300m
150m-
300m
0-
300m
150m-
300m
0-
300m
150m-
300m
0-
300m
150m-
300m
Observations 61,654 15,031 63,046 16,464 6,200 1,445 6,305 1,550
R2 0.932 0.905 0.932 0.897 0.992 0.992 0.987 0.987
Dependent variable is the equity-to-total-assets ratio in columns (1) to (4) and the z-score in columns (5) to (8).
Monthly data in columns (1) to (4) and annual data in columns (5) to (8). Post is a dummy equal to one for all
months after 12/2010 (indicating the treatment period). Treated1 is a dummy for banks in the first levy bracket
(facing a marginal levy rate of 0.02%) and Treated2 is a dummy for banks in the second levy bracket (marginal
levy rate of 0.03%). Treated is a dummy that combines all levy brackets to a single treatment group, being equal
to one if a bank has liabilities above the exemption threshold of e300 million. The control group are all banks
below the levy exemption threshold of e300 million, except in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) where the control group
are banks with relevant liabilities between e150 million and e300 million. Robust standard errors clustered at the
bank level in parentheses. ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
3.5.4 Implications for Levy Revenues
The decrease in affected banks’ levy bases directly implies a decrease in the govern-
ment’s levy revenues. The revenue losses are not completely identical to the levy base
effects estimated in Table 3.3 because of two reasons: First, if banks had not decreased
their levy base, they might have been in a higher levy bracket with higher levy rates,
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implying an even stronger effect on levy revenues. Second, if banks had not reduced
their levy bases, more banks would have been subject to the levy cap equal to 20% of
the bank’s after-tax profit, inhibiting the effect on levy revenues.
To get a feeling for the implied levy revenue losses due to the banks’ responses, I
conduct a back-of-the-envelope calculation using the results of the baseline regression
in column (5) of Table 3.3. I first calculate two out-of-the-sample predictions of each
bank’s ln(Levybase): One is a prediction with the actual data in my model, giving the
predicted log levy bases of my model. The second is calculated by setting the treatment
indicator to zero, giving a hypothetical value in case that the bank levy would not have
been introduced. By taking the exponential of these predicted values, I arrive at an
out-of-the-sample-prediction for the actual levy base and the hypothetical levy base
that banks would have had without the bank levy.13 Then I divide the difference
between these two predictions by the predicted actual levy revenues and arrive at a
percentage value describing how much higher levy revenues would have been if banks
had not adjusted their levy bases.
Figure 3.7: Implied Effect on Bank Levy Revenues
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Lost bank levy revenues due to the reduction in relevant liabilities as share
of predicted actual revenues. Lost revenues are calculated as the differ-
ence between levy revenues implied by an out-of-the sample prediction for
regression (5) in Table 3.3 with the treatement indicator set to zero, and
levy revenues implied if the treatment indicator is equal to one in the treat-
ment period. Bars show 95% confidence intervals implied by the regression.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, banks’ monthly balance sheet statistics (De-
cember data).
13As B˚ardsen and Lu¨tkepohl (2011) show, using the exponential of the log forecast yields
reasonable predictions for the levels of a variable.
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Figure 3.7 illustrates results for this procedure using December data for the treatment
years in my sample (as December data are the relevant data for the calculation of bank
levy payments). The bars illustrate a confidence interval, resulting when using the
upper and lower boundaries of the 95% interval of the treatment coefficient in column
(5) of Table 3.3 when calculating predictions of the hypothetical levy bases. The point
estimates imply that levy revenues would have been 5.1% (in 2013) to 7.0% (in 2012)
higher without adjustments in the levy bases. Applying these estimates to the actual
levy revenues illustrated in Figure 3.3 shows that levy revenues would have been up to
e46 million higher. This means that banks’ balance sheet adjustments explain only
a relatively small share of the gap between actual and planned bank levy revenues.
The major part of the revenue shortfall is due to the fact that the legislator based its
predictions on pre-crisis balance sheets, in which banks had higher profits and the levy
cap was therefore binding for a smaller share of banks than was true after the crisis.
Note that thecalculated implied levyrevenue losshere isa ratherconservativeestimate,
as I implicitly assume that banks’ profits would remain unchanged. In fact the foregone
funds would have created additional profits which increased levy caps and thereby
revenues. I also do not consider potential adjustments in the derivative component
of the bank levy. Moreover, the effect that the reduction in banks’ systemic risk has
on state budgets is probably of much higher importance: As shown in Section 3.5.3,
affected banks’ insolvency risk decreases on average by about 15%, reducing expected
costs for potential bank bail-outs in the future.
3.6 Shifting to Foreign Subsidiaries
The previously presented results suggest that the German bank levy indeed had the
intended Pigouvian effect on affected banks’ balance sheets. However, multinational
banks have the possibility to partially circumvent the bank levy as the law does not
affect legally independent foreign subsidiaries of German banks. By reducing relevant
liabilities in their German entities and foreign branches and increasing them (and the
related activities) in foreign subsidiaries, multinational banks can avoid bank levy
payments without actually reducing overall liabilities. This section examines whether
German multinational banks used this possibility to avoid levy payments. Therefore,
I look at potential destinations for the fund shifting by evaluating the evolution of
relevant liabilities in non-affected foreign subsidiaries of affected German bank groups.
Then, I estimate how this weakens the positive effects found in the previous sections.
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3.6.1 Data and Empirical Strategy
If levy-affected German multinational banks indeed have shifted liabilities in response
to the introduction of the German bank levy in 2011, we should observe an increase
in liabilities in the potential destination entities, namely in their foreign subsidiaries
in countries without bank levies. In line with the previous sections, the straight-
forward way to evaluate this hypothesis would be to compare foreign subsidiaries of
levy-affected German banks with foreign subsidiaries of non-affected German banks.
However, the problem with this approach is that almost all German banks with for-
eign subsidiaries have relevant liabilities of at least e300 million and are thus affected
by the bank levy, leaving us without an appropriate control group for the foreign sub-
sidiaries of levy-affected banks.
As an alternative, I compare subsidiaries of German banks with matched non-German
banks. All data are taken from Bankscope, an international banks balance sheet
statistics database from Bureau van Djik. Bankscope data have several drawbacks
compared to the administrative data on German banks used in the previous sections.
First, variables in Bankscope are only available with annual frequency, therefore this
part of the analysis is conducted on a yearly basis. Second, Bankscope does not provide
a full sample of all German bank subsidiaries. As the Bundesbank data show, there
are 50 foreign subsidiaries of German banks in countries that do not have a bank levy
by 2011 and are therefore potential destinations for fund shifting. In Bankscope I can
only observe 37 of them, indicating a 74% coverage of affected subsidiaries. And third,
Bankscope data is less detailed than Bundesbank data. This means that I cannot
calculate levy bases of bank subsidiaries as precisely as in the previous sections. Thus,
I use total assets minus equity and customer deposits as dependent variable here, which
is a reasonably good approximation of the actual tax base for the bank levy.14
To get a set of control banks that is comparable to the foreign subsidiaries of German
banks and that exhibits a parallel pre-treatment trend in the outcome variable, I
conduct a two-stage matching procedure along the lines of Schepens (2016). In the
first stage, I conduct a within-country matching for each country without a bank levy
(by 2011) in which German banks have foreign affiliates. Therefore, I first estimate
a logit regression with data from the pre-treatment year 2009. The sample consists
14According to aggregate reports on German banks from Deutsche Bundesbank (2017a), the
approximation for the levy base used in this section is, on average, only 1.1% higher in the sample
period than the actual levy base (as calculated in the previous sections).
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of all German bank subsidiaries and non-German banks15 from Bankscope in the
considered country for which I observe all relevant variables during the full period
under consideration. I remove all bank subsidiaries whose parent resides in a country
with bank levies from the donor pool, as they might also have a shifting incentive and
are therefore also potentially treated.
The dependent variable in the matching equation is a dummy equal to one for German
banks and zero for non-German banks. In line with the matching equation employed
by Schepens (2016), explanatory variables are the natural logarithms of the levy base,
equity and deposits and the contemporaneous and the lagged growth rates of the levy
base (to match non-German banks that have parallel trends in liabilities). Then, I
calculate predicted probabilities of the logit model and match to each German bank
subsidiary its three nearest non-German neighbors from the same country (with re-
placement).
This procedure is repeated for all countries. As in some countries Bankscope does
not provide a sufficient donor pool of non-German banks, I then do a second round
matching which is not restricted to banks within the same country to get the missing
matches.16 To ensure that banks from similar countries are matched, I now include
country level explanatory variables (natural logarithms of GDP and population) in
the matching equation. The resulting sample of this two round matching procedure
consists of 37 German bank subsidiaries and 111 matched non-German banks. 68%
of all matched banks come from the within-country matching round, the remainder is
matched in the second round.
I then use this sample to systematically investigate the shifting hypothesis by estimat-
ing the following equation:
ln(Levybaseijt) = β0 + β1 Germanij · Postt + β2Xjt + γij + δt + ijt (3.2)
where j indicates countries, i is a bank index and t indexes years here. Germanij is
a dummy equal to one for foreign subsidiaries of German multinational banks (the
potential destinations for funds) and zero for all matched non-German banks. Postt
15Ownership information in Bankscope is incomplete and I cannot identify with certainty
whether a bank is a subsidiary of a foreign bank or a domestic bank. To get a sufficiently large
donor pool for the matching procedure, I therefore use the full set of non-German banks, both
domestic and foreign-owned.
16Countries in which a second round matching is necessary are Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Brazil, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Honduras, Ireland,
Netherlands, Nicaragua and Turkey.
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indicates the treatment period after the introduction of the bank levy. X jt is a vector of
country level control variables and consists of the GDP growth rate, the inflation rate
and the statutory corporate tax rate. γij and δt capture bank and year fixed effects,
respectively, and ijt is the error term.
In a robustness check, I only use one bank (the nearest neighbor) per German bank
subsidiary as control group. Results are presented along with the baseline results in
the next section. In Appendix C.4, I conduct two further robustness checks on the
matching procedure: First, I exclude growth rates from the matching equation and
match only on the levels of the levy base, equity and deposits in the first pre-treatment
period. This accounts for the potential concern that matching on growth rates me-
chanically produces parallel pre-treatment trends. Although results in this setting are
somewhat weaker, I still find shifting evidence. The second robustness check consid-
ers the sample: Instead of Bankscope I use comprehensive and precise Bundesbank
data on foreign subsidiaries of German banks and compare them to a control group
of matched German domestic banks that are not affected by the bank levy. With the
drawback that this setting suffers from limited comparability of treatment and control
groups, results again confirm the shifting hypothesis.
3.6.2 Results on Fund Shifting
Figure 3.8 shows some first graphical evidence for the shifting hypothesis: Prior to the
introduction of the German bank levy there is a similar trend in relevant liabilities of
German bank subsidiaries in non-levy countries and the matched set of control banks.
Beginning with balance sheets relevant for the levy in 2011,17 relevant liabilities in
foreign subsidiaries of German banks increased compared to the control group of non-
German banks, which is in line with the shifting hypothesis examined here.
Panel A of Table 3.6 presents the corresponding regression results on the levy base. I
find a positive coefficient of 0.177 for the interaction term between German and Post
in column (1) which is significant on the 3% level, in line with the prediction of the
fund shifting hypothesis. This estimate indicates an increase of the levy base due to
the German bank levy by about 19% compared to the matched non-German banks.
When controlling for country characteristics in column (2), the estimated treatment
effect remains very similar at 0.162. Restricting the control group to only one nearest
17The relevant balance sheet for the levy is the balance sheet of December in the previous year.
Therefore, levy bases e.g. for the first levy year 2011 are calculated with balance sheet data from
12/2010.
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Figure 3.8: Trends in Foreign Subsidiaries’ Relevant Liabilities
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Time trend in levy bases of banks in countries without bank levies. The blue line shows rele-
vant liabilities of German bank subsidiaries in these countries. The red line depicts relevant
liabilities of matched non-German banks. Series are normalized by the pre-treatment mean.
The vertical line indicates the introduction of the German bank levy. Data: Bankscope.
neighbor per German bank subsidiary in columns (3) and (4) confirms this finding
with even larger coefficients.
PanelBof Table3.6 reports results of the sameregressions for the equity-to-total-assets
ratio. Results mirror the findings on relevant liabilities: Equity ratios in German bank
subsidiaries declined after the introduction of the German bank levy compared to the
matched non-German banks. However, the coefficient is significant only in the one-
to-one matching sample in columns (3) and (4).
Overall, the results show that German multinational banks indeed increased their
liabilities in non-affected foreign subsidiaries, thus deteriorating their capitalization
after the introduction of the German bank levy. Therefore, the analysis provides
evidence that German banks indeed shifted their liabilities abroad, as was feared by
some members of the German parliament.
3.6.3 Influence on Baseline Results
The shifting of inter-bank liabilities to foreign subsidiaries weakens the positive effect
of the German bank levy on the capitalization of the core banks found in Section 3.5.1.
Abstracting from adjustments in the portfolio risk of affected banks, the shifting means
that German entities become less risky whereas the default risk of foreign subsidiaries
increases. However, the risk is now separated from the core institute and a potential
default of the foreign subsidiary affects the German parent only up to the investment it
made into the subsidiary in terms of equity and internal loans. Apart from this weak-
ened positive effect on the riskiness of multinational banks, there is still the unaffected
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Table 3.6: Regressions on Fund Shifting
Panel A: Levy base regressions
Dep. var.: ln(Levybase)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
German · Post 0.177∗∗ 0.162∗∗ 0.231∗∗ 0.224∗∗
(0.083) (0.081) (0.110) (0.098)
GDP growth -0.054 -0.280
(0.299) (0.456)
Inflation rate -0.015∗ -0.014
(0.008) (0.011)
Corporate tax rate 3.368∗∗∗ 3.725
(1.135) (2.745)
Bank FE & year FE X X X X
# of matched control banks per treated bank 3 3 1 1
Observations 1,036 1,036 518 518
R2 0.954 0.955 0.940 0.940
Panel B: Equity ratio regressions
Dep. var.: Equity/TA (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
German · Post -0.873 -0.807 -2.036∗ -1.929∗
(0.826) (0.937) (1.110) (1.109)
GDP growth 0.751 6.053
(3.446) (4.597)
Inflation rate 0.052 -0.026
(0.096) (0.115)
Corporate tax rate -17.101 -47.827∗
(13.062) (27.667)
Bank FE & year FE X X X X
# of matched control banks per treated bank 3 3 1 1
Observations 1,036 1,036 518 518
R2 0.802 0.802 0.783 0.781
Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of relevant liabilities for the German bank levy in Panel A, and the
equity-to-total-assets ratio (in %) in Panel B. The sample comprises 37 foreign subsidiaries of levy-affected German
banks in countries without bank levies and matched non-German banks. Three matches per German bank, except
in column (3) where I use only one nearest neighbor per German bank as control. German is a dummy equal to
one for subsidiaries of German banks and zero for non-German banks. Post is a dummy indicating the treatment
period in which the bank levy was in place. Annual data for 2007 to 2013 from Bankscope. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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positive effect on the capitalization of banks without subsidiaries in non-levy coun-
tries that cannot engage in fund shifting. To investigate to which extent fund shifting
influences the overall effect on inter-bank liabilities, this section consolidates data in-
cluding foreign subsidiaries of German banks and re-estimates regression equation
(3.1), investigating a potential treatment effect heterogeneity between multinational
and non-multinational banks. By including a dummy for whether a bank has foreign
subsidiaries in countries without bank levies, I can distinguish effects of the levy on
banks without shifting possibility from effects on banks that can shift liabilities to
foreign subsidiaries.
Table3.7presents the results. Column(1) showsthatconsolidating foreignsubsidiaries
does not considerably affect the baseline result found in Table 3.3: The estimated
treatment effect is basically unchanged. In column (2), I add an interaction term
between the treatment indicator and the variable Multi, a dummy equal to one if
the bank is multinational and has foreign subsidiaries in non-levy countries. The
coefficient for Treated · Post now measures the pure effect of the bank levy on banks
that do not have a shifting possibility.
The results suggest an absolutely larger treatment effect of -8.1% on these banks,
compared to the overall effect of -7.5% in column (1). This means that the shifting
possibility of multinational banks reduces the average effect by about 7%. Regarding
multinational banks that have potential subsidiaries to shift to, the t-test in the last line
of column (2) (testing the null hypothesis Treated ·Post+Treated ·Post ·Multi = 0)
shows that there is no significant effect on their consolidated levy base. Columns (3)
and (4) repeat the analysis with controlling for the core banks’ profitability and find
very similar results. When restricting the control group to banks with levy bases
between e150 million and e300 million, I confirm the effect already found with the
data on the core institutes in Table 3.3. When interacting with the Multinational
dummy, I again find that the absolute effect increases for banks without a shifting
possibility. There is also no significant effect on consolidated levy bases of potential
shifting banks.
In columns (7) to (10) of Table 3.7 I find analogous results for banks’ equity-to-total-
assets ratios. When distinguishing between multinational and non-multinational
banks in columns (8) and (10), the positive effect of the bank levy on banks’ equity ra-
tios increases slightly. By contrast, the effect on consolidated equity ratios of banks
with potential shifting subsidiaries is not significant.
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Table 3.7: Regressions with Consolidation of Foreign Subsidiaries
Dep. var.: ln(Levybase) Dep. var.: Equity/TA (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Treated · Post -0.078∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗ 0.182∗ 0.191∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.147∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020) (0.104) (0.105) (0.068) (0.071)
Treated · Post · Multi 0.099∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ -0.141 -0.137
(0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.145) (0.146)
Multi 0.213∗ 0.138 0.229∗∗ 0.133 0.232∗∗ 0.137 2.255∗∗∗ 2.361∗∗∗ 2.215∗∗∗ 2.318∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.115) (0.105) (0.109) (0.096) (0.101) (0.709) (0.730) (0.700) (0.719)
ROAt−1 3.063∗∗∗ 3.063∗∗∗ 7.295∗∗∗ 7.216∗∗∗
(0.714) (0.714) (1.860) (1.867)
Bank FE & Time FE X X X X X X X X X X
Control group (million e) 0-300 0-300 0-300 0-300 150-300 150-300 0-300 0-300 150-300 150-300
Observations 63,168 63,168 60,764 60,764 15,124 15,124 63,046 63,046 16,423 16,423
R2 0.989 0.989 0.991 0.991 0.990 0.990 0.932 0.932 0.896 0.896
Treat. effect multi. (p-val.) 0.713 0.613 0.197 0.751 0.956
Dependent variables are the natural logarithm of the levy base in columns (1) to (6) and the equity-to-total-assets ratio in columns (7) to (10). Post is a dummy equal to one
for all months after 12/2010 (indicating the treatment period). Multi is a dummy indicating whether a bank is a multinational bank having foreign subsidiaries in countries
without bank levies. Treated is a dummy equal to one for banks affected by the German bank levy because of having relevant liabilities above the exemption threshold of
e300 million. The control group are all banks below the levy exemption threshold of e300 million, except in columns (5), (6), (9) and (10) where the control group are
banks with relevant liabilities between e150 million and e300 million. ROAt−1 is the lagged return on assets. The last line reports p-values of testing the null hypothesis
Treated ·Post+ Treated ·Post ·Multi = 0. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
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Taken together, the results suggest that the German bank levy succeeded in reduc-
ing the potentially risk-transmitting inter-bank liabilities in German core institutes.
However, multinational banks use their possibility to circumvent the levy by relocat-
ing affected liabilities to non-affected foreign subsidiaries, weakening the overall effect.
As multinational banks with potential shifting subsidiaries held 18% of total relevant
liabilities (in 12/2009), the quantitative effect of this way to circumvent the bank levy
is considerable.
3.7 Conclusion
More and more countries have introduced bank levies as part of their efforts to prevent
future financial crises. Additional to the revenue motive, these levies have a Pigouvian
intention as they are thought to reduce potentially risk-transmitting inter-bank lia-
bilities and make banks more stable. This chapter exploits the design of the German
bank levy by comparing levy-affected banks with banks that are below the exemption
threshold using a difference-in-differences methodology. I find evidence for a direct
negative effect of the bank levy on relevant inter-bank liabilities, implying that bank
levies indeed reduce potentially risk-transmitting funds and thereby systemic risks in
the financial sector. As a result, business volumes of affected banks decreased and
capitalization and funding risk improved. However, I also find evidence that multi-
national banks shifted affected funds to non-affected foreign subsidiaries. For banks
having this possibility, the negative effect on inter-bank liabilities vanishes. Since the
distress of large multinational banks is a particular threat to the stability of the whole
banking sector, it is important to close this loophole.
The results of this analysis are not only relevant for the German case considered here,
but also for the newly introduced European bank levy. The Single Resolution Board
now imposes levies without exempting smaller banks or setting caps, and the levy
payment is still a positive function of liabilities net of equity and deposits. This means
that all European banks subject to the bank levy now have an incentive to lower their
relevant liabilities and to shift funds to non-European subsidiaries to lower their levy
payments.
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Conclusion
This dissertation has considered the taxation of the financial sector, investigating
empirically the effectiveness of different tax instruments in the banking sector. Two
of the three essays look at ways how banks avoid corporate tax payments, the third
essay evaluates banks’ responses to bank levies – a new bank-specific tax instrument
introduced after the financial crisis.
All essays have in common that they empirically examine legal ways for banks to cir-
cumvent the considered tax instrument. Chapter 1 has shown that banks strategically
locate the highly profitable business unit of proprietary trading to low-taxed affiliates.
As they do not correspondingly relocate their traders, this tax avoidance channel can
be classified as profit shifting rather than a relocation of real activity. In Chapter 2 I
investigate the extent to which banks engage in internal debt shifting, presumably the
most important of the classical profit shifting channels identified in previous literature
on non-financial sectors. Results show that banks shift substantially more profits via
internal debt than non-banks do. This extensive profit shifting evidence renders the
standard corporate tax a rather ineffective instrument for taxing the multinational
financial sector. Chapter 3 analyzes a new bank-specific tax instrument: By taxing
inter-bank liabilities, bank levies cannot only generate additional revenues, but they
can also achieve the Pigouvian goal of reducing potentially risk-transmitting funds.
But again I find that banks having a possibility to circumvent the levy make use of this
levy avoidance channel.
All these results show that it is a special challenge for policymakers to effectively
tax the financial sector. Regardless of whether the tax has a Pigouvian intention or
a purely fiscal objective, banks use their available channels to avoid tax payments.
These strong avoidance reactions to taxation are inherent to the nature of the banking
business: Major parts of it are highly internationally mobile and can be transferred
to other countries without actually shifting customers or employees. Moreover, banks
are inherently experts in the profit-maximizing optimization of financial transactions.
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Whereasothermultinationalshave tobuytax-planningadvisory services fromexternal
consulting firms, banks already have a substantial knowledge within the firm. It is self-
evident that they use his knowledge also for their own accounts.
In the lightof thisgreatpotential for taxavoidance, it is surprising that legal regulations
oncorporate taxationarevery lax in thefinancial sector. For instance, several countries
exclude banks from being affected by their controlled-foreign-corporation rules that
should prevent profit shifting (e.g. the United States and Germany). In the case
of bank levies, some of the countries that have introduced a levy do not tax foreign
subsidiaries. As found in Chapter 3, this enables multinational banks to shift funds to
these non-affected affiliates.
Peralta et al. (2006) provide an explanation for these lax regulations: Countries may
deliberately choose not to prevent profit shifting, as it allows policymakers to tax
domestic banks at higher rates, and at the same time to attract highly mobile, large
international banks. This dilemma can only be tackled with international cooperation
in the taxation and regulation of banks. Also the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) has recognized the special role of the financial
sector and has updated its action plan on base erosion and profit shifting with a special
passage covering the challenges that the financial sector poses to the legislator (OECD,
2016). Although the specific proposals of the action plan are vague, the results of my
thesis suggest that the fundamental idea of international harmonization is necessary
to ensure that banks contribute an adequate share to the public budget, reflecting the
risks they pose to the whole economy.
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A Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Corporate Tax Rates on Bank Profits
Table A.1: Corporate Tax Rates (CTR) Affecting Banks’ Trading Gains in %
Country 2011 2014
CTR CTR CTR CTR
general banks general banks
Argentina 35 35 35 35
Australia 30 30 30 30
Austria 25 25 25 25
Belgium 34 34 34 34
Brazil 34 40 34 40
Bulgaria 10 10 10 10
Canada 28 28 26.5 26.5
Cayman Islands 0 0 0 0
Chile 20 20 20 20
China 25 25 25 25
Curac¸ao 34.5 34.5 27.5 27.5
Czech Republic 19 19 19 19
Denmark 25 25 24.5 24.5
Finland 26 26 20 20
France 34.43 34.43 34.43 34.43
Germany 30 30 30 30
Greece 20 20 26 26
Hong Kong 16.5 0∗ 16.5 0∗
Hungary 19 19 19 19
India 32.44 32.44 33.99 33.99
Indonesia 25 25 25 25
Iran 25 25 25 25
Ireland 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5
Italy 31.4 32.15 31 31.7
Japan 40.69 40.69 35.64 35.64
Jersey 0 10 0 10
Korea 24.2 24.2 24.2 24.2
Luxembourg 28.8 28.8 29.22 29.22
Malaysia 25 25 25 25
Malta 35 35 35 35
Mauritius 15 15 15 15
Mexico 30 30 30 30
Netherlands 25 25 25 25
New Zealand 28 28 28 28
Norway 28 28 27 27
Pakistan 35 35 33 33
Peru 30 30 30 30
Philippines 30 30 30 30
Poland 19 19 19 19
Portugal 25 25 23 23
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Table A.1: Corporate tax rates (CTR) affecting banks’ trading gains, continued
Country 2011 2014
CTR CTR CTR CTR
general banks general banks
Qatar 10 10 10 10
Russian Federation 20 20 20 20
Saudi Arabia 20 20 20 20
Singapore 17 0∗ 17 0∗
Slovakia 19 19 22 22
South Africa 34.55 34.55 28 28
Spain 30 30 30 30
Sri Lanka 28 0∗ 28 0∗
Sweden 26.3 26.3 22 22
Switzerland 21.17 21.17 21.15 21.15
Taiwan 17 17 17 17
Thailand 30 30 20 20
Turkey 20 20 20 20
Ukraine 23 23 18 18
United Arab Emirates 0 20 0 20
United Kingdom 26 26 21 21
United States 39.19 39.19 39.08 39.08
Vietnam 25 25 22 22
Tax rate data from Ernst & Young (2011, 2014) and KPMG (2016). CTR
denotes statutory corporate tax rates. ∗ indicates special tax rates ap-
plying to corporate capital gains such as gains from proprietary trading,
not only to banks. Countries listed are all countries in which German
banks have affiliates.
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A.2 Variable Definitions
Table A.2: Variable Definitions and Sources
Variable Definition Source
Bundesbank Data
Fixed-income trading assets Bonds and debt securities held for trading Deutsche Bundesbank
(2015a)
Trading derivatives Absolute sum of derivatives with positive and neg-
ative fair value that are held for trading
Deutsche Bundesbank
(2015a)
Total assets Total external assets held in the affiliate Deutsche Bundesbank
(2015a)
Bank group total assets Total assets in all affiliates and in the headquarter
of a bank group
Deutsche Bundesbank
(2015a)
Employees Number of employees in the affiliate Deutsche Bundesbank
(2015b)
Subsidiary dummy =1 if foreign affiliate is a separate legal entity Deutsche Bundesbank
(2015a)
Bankscope Data
Trading assets Total trading assets at fair value Bankscope
Total assets Total assets of the affiliate Bankscope
Personnel expenses Annual personnel expenses Bankscope
Country-level variables
Corporate tax rate Statutory tax rate applicable to bank profits in the
form of corporate capital gains
Ernst & Young (2011,
2014)
GDP Nominal gross domestic product, interpolated from
quarterly to monthly values using the proportional
Denton method (Bloem et al., 2001)
IMF, OECD*
Inflation rate Consumer price inflation rate IMF*
GDP growth Annual growth rate of real GDP IMF*
Financial sector share Share of the banking and insurance sector in a coun-
try’s gross value added, monthly values interpolated
using cubic spline interpolation
OECD*
Regulation Index on the regulation of securities activities (se-
curities underwriting, brokering, dealing, and all as-
pects of the mutual fund industry); unrestricted =
1, permitted with limits = 2, tight restriction = 3,
prohibited = 4
Barth et al. (2013)
Country average wage Average wage in current prices OECD*
Data sources marked with a * are complemented by data from national statistical offices available online.
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A.3 Analysis with Bankscope Data
To show that our results also hold in a more international sample, we also test both hy-
potheses using Bureau van Dijk’s Bankscope data. As noted in Section 3.3, Bankscope
has several problems regarding its coverage. A major disadvantage is that it does not
cover branches.
We use Bankscope data from 2002 to 2014.1 We consider a bank a subsidiary if the
parent bank owns more than 50% of its shares. We use only unconsolidated data and
eliminate central banks and governmental credit institutions from our sample. After
dropping all observations with missing or negative total assets, loans or trading assets,
3,744 firm-year observations remain. The sample covers 971 subsidiaries, which belong
to 667 bank groups. Table A.3 presents the basic descriptives for this dataset.
Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics for Bankscope Data
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. p1 p50 p99
Trading assets (million USD) 3,744 1,500 15,490 0 4 28,390
Total assets (million USD) 3,744 21,490 105,400 37 2,425 310,000
Corporate tax rate 3,744 0.324 0.093 0.000 0.373 0.400
Nominal GDP (billion USD) 3,744 7,896 7,222 16 3,545 17,351
Inflation rate (%) 3,744 2.259 2.169 -0.666 1.957 9.297
GDP growth (%) 3,744 1.882 2.960 -2.861 1.787 10.169
Regulation 3,744 2.060 0.956 1 2 3
Financial sector share 3,744 0.065 0.022 0.031 0.067 0.110
Personnel expenses (million USD) 3,480 211 1,325 1 28 3,510
Country average wage (USD) 3,480 46,774 21,139 2,509 52,438 94,881
Data from Bankscope database of Bureau van Dijk (2014). All variables on annual frequency for 2002 to 2014.
As the Bankscope dataset is not complete and is missing information on foreign
branches, we cannot exactly identify which bank groups are active internationally
and which are not. We thus run our regressions on two subsamples: First, we use the
full sample, which also includes purely domestic banks (sample I). Second, we restrict
the sample to banks that either have at least one subsidiary in a foreign country within
the Bankscope data, or are themselves a subsidiary of an internationally active bank
group (sample II). As Bankscope does not have full coverage of all affiliates, this sample
selection step implies that we also drop some banks that were, in fact, multinational.
1Note that Bankscope is no longer available. Bureau van Dijk replaced it with Orbis Bank
Focus at the end of 2016. Orbis Bank Focus contains only three years of historical data for most
banks and has similar coverage issues as Bankscope.
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Table A.4 presents the estimation results, testing Hypothesis 1 in Panel A and Hy-
pothesis 2 in Panel B. In Panel A, we regress the inverse hyperbolic sine of overall
trading assets on the corporate tax rate and a set of control variables. Columns (1)
and (2) show the results for sample I, and columns (3) and (4) for the smaller sample II.
We find that a 1%-point decrease in the tax rate increases trading assets by 8.2% in
sample I, and by 6.7% in sample II.2 In columns (2) and (4), we report results includ-
ing country fixed effects. The point estimates are negative also in these regressions,
but not significant. This is likely because there is little variation in the tax rates, and
almost no variation in tax havens.3
Due to the lack of sufficient variation in tax rates, we also cannot use the corporate
tax rate as an instrument for trading assets when testing Hypothesis 2. The corporate
tax rate is a weak instrument in all settings. Thus, we instrument the trading assets of
an affiliate by the total volume of trading assets in all other affiliates of the same bank
group. These results are reported in Panel B of Table A.4.4 The dependent variable
in these regressions is the inverse hyperbolic sine of personnel expenses. As we now
observe only personnel expenses, not the number of employees, we additionally control
for the average wage in the country. We find that the volume of trading assets does not
significantly affect personnel expenses in low-tax countries (countries with a lower tax
rate than the headquarter of the affiliate). By contrast, in high-tax countries we find
again significantly positive effects of trading assets on personnel expenses both with
and without country fixed effects. In total, these results again confirm Hypothesis 2.5
2The fact that we find a smaller coefficient in sample II indicates that some banks that are
only in sample I react strongly to tax rates. Likely, these banks use branches in other countries.
3Only for 379 (out of 3744) observations the tax rate changes, and most of those are in Italy
(131), the United Kingdom (76) and Bulgaria (24); in tax havens, there is only one observation
with a tax rate change (in Curac¸ao).
4Panel B shows results only for sample I. Using sample II, we find very similar results.
5Unfortunately, the first stage F-statistics indicate a weak instrument problem in the regres-
sions for low-tax countries. As we have no other plausible instrument available, we nevertheless
report these results and acknowledge that the instrumental variable estimations are likely biased.
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Table A.4: Regressions with Bankscope Data
Panel A: Effects on proprietary trading
Sample I Sample II
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Corporate tax rate -8.182*** -3.900 -6.731** -10.641
(-3.18) (-0.49) (-2.23) (-1.21)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year & Bank group FE Yes No Yes No
Country FE No Yes No Yes
R2 0.847 0.596 0.621 0.420
Observations 3,744 3,744 1,393 1,393
Panel B: Effects on real activity (sample I only)
IV: Trading others
Low-tax High-tax Low-tax High-tax
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IHS(Trading) -0.051 0.305*** -0.021 0.294***
(-0.01) (5.46) (-0.00) (5.49)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year & Bank group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No Yes Yes
First stage F 2.051 167.781 2.621 182.044
Observations 976 2,428 973 2,428
Centered R2 0.783 0.548 0.867 0.573
Data from Bankscope database of Bureau van Dijk (2014). The dependent variable in Panel A is IHS(Trading
assets), and in Panel B IHS(Personnel expenses). Control variables are IHS(Total assets), IHS(GDP), inflation,
GDP growth, financial sector share and regulation in Panel A and IHS(GDP), inflation, GDP growth, financial
sector share, subsidiary dummy, IHS(country average wage) and regulation in Panel B. Sample I includes all banks,
sample II is a sub-sample of banks that have at least one foreign subsidiary within the Bankscope dataset. Yearly
bank data for 2002-2014. t-statistics in parentheses, based on bootstrapped standard errors clustered by bank group
and by country-year.
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B.1 Variable Definitions
Table B.1: Variable Definitions and Sources
Variable Definition
Bank-level variables from Deutsche Bundesbank (2015a)
Internal liabilities (IntLiab) Liabilities to affiliates of the same bank group
Internal claims Claims to affiliates of the same bank group
Internal net debt
(IntNetDebt)
Volume of internal liabilities that effectively shift profits
out of an affiliate, defined as
max(IntLiab− InternalClaims; 0)
Total assets (TA) Total external assets held in the affiliate
Conduit debt Internal liabilities that are effectively passed through an
affiliate, because being opposed to internal claims of the
same amount; defined as min(InternalClaims; IntLiab)
Conduit share Share of internal liabilities that are passed through an
affiliate, defined as min( InternalClaimsIntLiab ; 1)
Country-level variables
Corporate tax rate (CTR) Statutory corporate tax rate affecting banks (Source:
Ernst & Young, 2011, 2014)
GDP Nominal gross domestic product, proportional Denton
method (Bloem et al., 2001) used to interpolate from
quarterly to monthly values (Source: IMF, OECD*)
Inflation rate Consumer price inflation rate (Source: IMF*)
GDP growth Annual growth rate of real GDP (Source: IMF*)
Financial sector share Share of the banking and insurance sector in a country’s
gross value added, monthly values interpolated using
cubic spline interpolation (Source: OECD*)
Capital requirement Minimum regulatory capital requirement for banks
(Source: World Bank, 2011)
Regulatory index Index on capital regulation, capturing whether capital
requirements are adjusted for individual risk of banks,
whether the regulatory capital is adjusted for certain
market value losses and whether certain funds may be
used to capitalize a bank; ranging from 0 (low stringency)
to 10 (high stringency) (Source: Barth et al., 2013)
Data sources marked with a * are complemented by data from national statistical offices.
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B.2 Conduit Share Regressions
Table B.2: Regressions on Affiliates’ Conduit Shares
Dep. var.: Conduit share in internal debt
(1) (2) (3)
CTR -0.550∗∗∗ -0.527∗∗∗ -0.347∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.047) (0.044)
IHS(TA) -0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
IHS(Population) -0.032∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Inflation rate 0.018∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP growth 0.011∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Financial sector share 0.407∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.062) (0.059)
Headquarter 0.379∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Regulatory index -0.029∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Capital requirement -3.091∗∗∗ -3.580∗∗∗ -5.598∗∗∗
(0.489) (0.487) (0.445)
Monthly time FE X X
Bank group FE X
R2 0.127 0.147 0.345
Observations 19,754 19,754 19,754
Dependent variable is the share of conduit debt in total internal
liabilities as defined by max( InternalClaimsit
InternalLiabilitiesit
; 1). IHS(TA)
is the inverse hyperbolic sine of affiliate i’s total assets. Finan-
cial sector share is the share of the banking and insurance sec-
tor in a country’s gross value added. Headquarter is a dummy
indicating whether affiliate i is a German headquarter. Regula-
tory index captures the stringency of capital regulation in a coun-
try, ranging from 0 to 10 (higher values indicating greater strin-
gency). Standard errors in parentheses. Monthly bank data for
06/2010-12/2015 from the External Positions of Banks database
of Deutsche Bundesbank (2015a).
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C.1 Variable Definitions
Table C.1: Variable Definitions and Sources
Variable Definition
Bank-level variables from Deutsche Bundesbank (2017b):
Total Liabilities Balance sheet total of a bank
Equity Equity capital of a bank
Customer deposits All liabilities to non-banks (customers)
Profit participation capital Profit participation capital of a bank
Fund for general banking risk Reserves for general banking risks
Levy base Tax base for the German bank levy, calculated as Total
Liabilities - Equity - Customer deposits - Profit
participation capital - Fund for general banking risk; when
using Bankscope data, the levy base is approximated by
Total Liabilities - Equity - Customer deposits
Return on assets (ROA) Profits after taxes divided by balance sheet total, annual
variable (December)
Equity/TA Equity-to-total-assets ratio of a bank in %
Z-score Measure for the probability of insolvency of a bank going
back to Roy (1952), calculated as (Capital/Total Assets +
ROA) / sd(ROA) where Capital = Equity + Fund for
general banking risk and sd(ROA) is the standard
deviation of a bank’s return on assets in the sample period
Treated1 Dummy variable equal to one if the bank is in the first
levy bracket in the whole sample period, having a levy
base between e300 million and e10 billion and facing a
marginal levy rate of 0.02% in the treatment period
Treated2 Dummy variable equal to one if the bank is in the second
levy bracket in the whole sample period, having a levy
base between e10 billion and e100 billion and facing a
marginal levy rate of 0.03% in the treatment period
Treated Dummy variable equal to one if the bank is above the levy
exemption threshold of e300 million in the whole sample
period
Post Dummy variable equal to one from January 2011 when the
German bank levy was introduced, indicating the
treatment period
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Table C.1: Variable Definitions and Sources, continued
Variable Definition
German Dummy variable equal to one if the bank is a foreign
subsidiary of a German multinational bank and zero if it
is a non-German bank
Multi Dummy variable equal to one if the bank group is
multinational and has foreign subsidiaries in countries
that have not introduced bank levies by the end of 2011
Country-level variables from Ernst & Young (2011, 2014), IMF and national statistical offices:
Corporate tax rate Statutory tax rate applicable to bank profits
GDP Nominal gross domestic product
GDP growth Annual growth rate of gross domestic product
Inflation rate Consumer price inflation rate
Population Population of a country
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C.2 Growth Rates of Equity and Deposits
Table C.2: Regressions on Growth Rates of Equity and Deposits
Panel A: Separate treatment groups
Dep. var.: Annual growth Dep. var.: Annual growth
rate of customer deposits (%) rate of equity (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated1 · Post 87.409 -1.041 -14.514 0.962 0.092 -0.126
(77.263) (21.718) (15.635) (1.982) (0.509) (0.452)
Treated2 · Post 80.102 14.497 -2.778 -1.346 -3.146∗ -3.136∗
(71.192) (14.338) (3.902) (2.347) (1.891) (1.832)
Control for ROAt−1 X X X X
Bank & time FE X X X X X X
Control group 0-300m 0-300m 150m- 0-300m 0-300m 150m-
300m 300m
R2 0.047 0.092 0.171 0.049 0.279 0.503
Observations 61,335 59,558 14,020 61,147 59,708 14,068
Panel B: Combined treatment groups
Dep. var.: Annual growth Dep. var.: Annual growth
rate of customer deposits (%) rate of equity (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated · Post -53.171 3.051 -12.784 0.494 -0.711 -0.695
(159.340) (20.119) (14.897) (1.895) (0.632) (0.601)
Control for ROAt−1 X X X X
Bank & time FE X X X X X X
Control group 0-300m 0-300m 150m- 0-300m 0-300m 150m-
300m 300m
R2 0.043 0.093 0.166 0.049 0.272 0.385
Observations 62,714 60,614 15,076 62,539 60,764 15,124
Dependent variables are the annual growth rates of customer deposits in columns (1) to (3), and of equity in
columns (4) to (6). Post is a dummy equal to one for all months after 12/2010 (indicating the treatment period).
Treated1 is a dummy for banks in the first levy bracket (facing a marginal levy rate of 0.02%) and Treated2 is a
dummy for banks in the second levy bracket (marginal levy rate of 0.03%). Treated is a dummy that combines all
levy brackets to a single treatment group, being equal to one if a bank has liabilities above the exemption threshold
of e300 million. The control group are all banks below the levy exemption threshold of e300 million, except in
columns (3) and (6) where the control group are banks with relevant liabilities between e150 million and e300
million. ROAt−1 is the lagged return on assets. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level in parentheses.
* indicates significance at the 10% level.
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C.3 Equity and Deposits Regressions with Combined
Treatment Group
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C.4 Robustness Tests on Fund Shifting Regressions
This section provides robustness tests for the fund shifting hypothesis tested in Section
3.6, both on the econometric specification and on the sample: First, I test whether the
results hold with alternative matching variables that do not include growth rates of
the dependent variable. Second, I switch to data on foreign subsidiaries provided by
Deutsche Bundesbank (2017b) and use German domestic banks as alternative control
group. Results are largely robust to these checks.
C.4.1 Alternative Matching Variables
One concern with the matching procedure suggested by Schepens (2016) is that the
parallel pre-treatment trend is produced mechanically by including the contemporane-
ous and the lagged growth rates of the dependent variable into the matching equation.
As a first robustness test, I therefore change the matching variables: Here I only match
on the levels of the levy base, equity and deposits in the first pre-treatment year in the
sample (2008) and do not include any growth rates or multiple periods that may me-
chanically push the resulting time series to a parallel trend.1 All other specifications
are as explained in Section 3.6.
Figure C.1: Trends in Subsidiaries’ Liabilities with Alternative Matching
.
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Time trend in levy bases in countries without bank levies. The blue line shows relevant
liabilities of German bank subsidiaries in these countries. The red line depicts relevant
liabilities of matched non-German banks. Series are normalized by the pre-treatment mean.
The vertical line indicates the introduction of the German bank levy. Source: Bankscope.
Figure C.1 illustrates the time trends of levy bases in the treatment group and the
matched control group. Not surprisingly, the pre-treatment fit is not as good as when
including growth rates into the matching equation. However, qualitatively there are
1In the second round matching I still include ln(GDP) and ln(Population) into the matching
equation to ensure that banks from similar countries are matched.
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still the same pre-treatment trends in the treatment and control groups, and they
still diverge with the introduction of the German bank levy: From 2010 to 2011 the
levy base in German bank subsidiaries increased whereas it slightly decreased in the
matched non-German control banks.
Table C.4 presents regression results with this alternatively matched control group.
The treatment effect in the baseline specifications with three matches per German
bank in columns (1) and (2) is positive, but smaller than in Table 3.6 and insignificant.
When restricting the control group to the best match for each bank in columns (3) and
(4), I again find similar significant effects as estimated in Table 3.6. Results on equity
ratios in columns (5) to (8) consistently show a -1.5 percentage point effect of the levy
that is significant in two of the four regressions.
C.4.2 German Control Banks
A second robustness check regards the quality of the Bankscope sample. Instead
of matching non-German banks as control group for foreign subsidiaries of German
banks, I here match to each foreign subsidiary in countries without bank levies a
German domestic bank that is not affected by the bank levy (because being below the
exemption threshold). The advantage of this approach is that I can use precise and
complete data on all 50 potential destination subsidiaries of German banks from the
balance sheet statistics database of the Deutsche Bundesbank (2017b). However, the
comparison of foreign subsidiaries of multinational banks to German domestic banks
might be problematic as they are active in potentially very different markets.
The matching procedure is analogous to the one employed in Section 3.6: In a first
stage, I estimate a logit regression for the last pretreatment period with a dummy equal
to one for foreign subsidiaries as dependent variable. Again in the spirit of Schepens
(2016), matching variables are the natural logarithms of equity, customer deposits,
the contemporaneous and two annual lags of the levy base and the contemporaneous
and three lagged semiannual growth rates of the levy base. Based on the predicted
probabilities I then match to each foreign subsidiary in non-levy countries a German
control bank.
Figure C.2 graphically shows average levy bases in these treatment and control groups.
The fit of the time trends is not as good as in the baseline setting in Section 3.6, as levy
bases in matched German domestic banks are more volatile. But still there is a gap
after the introduction of the German bank levy in 2011, which graphically indicates
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Table C.4: Regressions on Fund Shifting with Alternative Matching
Panel A: Levy base regressions
Dep. var.: ln(Levy base)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
German · Post 0.053 0.056 0.188∗ 0.186∗
(0.088) (0.087) (0.111) (0.111)
GDP growth -0.316 -0.472
(0.320) (0.485)
Inflation rate -0.007 -0.012
(0.007) (0.010)
Corporate tax rate 3.950∗∗ 4.250
(1.669) (2.413)
Bank FE & year FE X X X X
# of matched control banks per treated bank 3 3 1 1
Observations 1,036 1,036 518 518
R2 0.953 0.953 0.945 0.946
Panel B: Equity ratio regressions
Dep. var.: Equity/TA (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
German · Post -1.524∗ -1.565∗ -1.545 -1.522
(0.915) (0.912) (1.421) (1.418)
GDP growth 2.581 7.307
(3.345) (6.208)
Inflation rate -0.003 -0.022
(0.071) (0.128)
Corporate tax rate -55.199∗∗∗ -58.759∗
(17.455) (30.879)
Bank FE & year FE X X X X
# of matched control banks per treated bank 3 3 1 1
Observations 1,036 1,036 518 518
R2 0.774 0.776 0.720 0.723
Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of relevant liabilities for the German bank levy in Panel A, and the
equity-to-total-assets ratio (in %) in Panel B. The sample comprises 37 foreign subsidiaries of levy affected German
banks in countries without bank levies and matched non-German banks. Three matches per German bank, except
in column (3) where I use only one nearest neighbor per German bank as control. German is a dummy equal to
one for subsidiaries of German banks and zero for non-German banks. Post is a dummy indicating the treatment
period in which the bank levy was in place. Annual data for 2007 to 2013 from Bankscope. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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that there was fund shifting.
Figure C.2: Trends in Subsidiaries’ Liabilities with German Control Banks
.
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Time trend in levy bases of German bank subsidiaries in countries without bank levies
(blue line) and the control group of matched German domestic banks (red line). Series are
normalized by the pre-treatment mean. The vertical line indicates the introduction of the
German bank levy. Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, banks’ monthly balance sheet statistics.
In a second step, I repeat the fund shifting regression estimated in Section 3.6 using this
sample. Table C.5 presents results. I find again a significantly positive treatment effect
of 0.278 on levy bases, and 0.211 when including macro-economic control variables.
These estimates are in line with the results found in Section 3.6, with coefficients being
even larger. In column (3) I again find a correspondingly negative treatment effect on
equity ratios, however when including country level control variables in column (4) it
gets absolutely smaller and insignificant.
Taken together, these robustness tests confirm the finding in Section 3.6 that German
multinational banks used their possibilities to circumvent the bank levy by relocating
affected inter-bank liabilities to foreign subsidiaries in countries that have not intro-
duced a levy.
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Table C.5: Regressions on Fund Shifting with German Control Banks
Dep. var.: Dep. var.:
ln(Levy base) Equity/TA (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign Subsidiary · Post 0.278∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ -0.988∗∗∗ -0.126
(0.028) (0.032) (0.362) (0.419)
GDP growth 0.001 0.142∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.049)
Inflation rate -0.009∗ 0.108
(0.006) (0.072)
Corporate tax rate 0.185 4.105
(0.366) (4.792)
Bank FE & year FE X X X X
Observations 13,584 12,562 13,584 12,562
R2 0.898 0.901 0.815 0.816
Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of relevant liabilities for the German bank
levy in columns (1) and (2), and the equity-to-total-assets ratio (in %) in columns (3) and
(4). The sample consists of foreign subsidiaries of levy affected German banks in countries
without bank levies and matched German domestic banks. Foreign Subsidiary is a dummy
equal to one for foreign subsidiaries of German banks and zero for matched German
domestic banks. Post is a dummy equal to one for all months after 12/2010 (indicating
the treatment period). Monthly data for 2008 to 2013 from Deutsche Bundesbank (2017b).
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 10%
levels, respectively.
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